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Friday, November 1, 1940

Of all the objects of study and reflection on which man focussed his conscious mind man himself is the last and most difficult. The movement inaugurated by ~~Socrates~~^{Socrates} and developed by Plato and Aristotle represents the final stage in the endeavor of that part of ancient mankind which had its habitat in the eastern end of the Mediterranean basin to become informed as a means to being better adjusted to life. The Egyptians and Babylonians had accumulated much knowledge most of which was probably due to their own efforts and some of which they may have obtained indirectly from the ancient Hindu and Chinese civilizations. From the Egyptians and Babylonians objective knowledge as well as art passed over to the peoples that came to be identified by the general term "Greeks." It was in Athens of the fifth pre-Christian century that social conditions came to a pass where some way had to be found to stem the tide of anarchy that threatened to disrupt the state. The authority of traditional customs and traditions had broken down. It was necessary to find in human nature a new foundation for an ordered society. This led Socrates to direct the attention of his contemporaries to the need of finding in the human being himself the principles that were to govern his life. The culmination of that effort is represented by Plato's dialogues and Aristotle's "Politics" and "Ethics."

An analogous development in the modern world on a much larger scale in both extent and intent began with the gradual breakdown of the Christian tradition in Europe. The sixteenth to eighteenth centuries were marked by rapid gains in man's knowledge of the world. But all that knowledge only contributed to his moral and spiritual disorientation. In Hobbes Hume and the Encyclopedists we have the modern analogue of the ancient Sophists. On the other hand Kant, Fichte and Hegel attempted to repeat in the modern world

what Socrates, Plato and Aristotle tried in the ancient world. They sought to formulate a design for living, a design that is based on principles which they believed could be derived from a proper understanding of reality and of man's place in it. The ^{their} outcome of ~~that~~ endeavors, though by no means necessarily in agreement with their approach or their conclusions, is the mass of literature dealing with ethics, religion and education. In that literature the purpose is not merely to describe the facts of conduct, belief and character which study and observation have revealed but to set up norms, to indicate what we should believe, how we should conduct ourselves and how to implant desirable character in the young. The works on political philosophy belong together with formal ethical studies to the category of the social aspect of human life.

There is a marked difference, however, between the ancient normative science of man and its modern analogue. The ancients were not given to fragmentizing the unity of human life. They never forgot its organic character even when their study of it necessitated that they center their attention upon a limited aspect of it. Whether it is the aspect of religion, politics, ethics or education that they treat of one always senses a realization of their organic relationship. It is otherwise in modern times. Each of these phases of human life is treated as though it were if not completely, at least largely independent of the other phases. Philosophy, Ethics, Religion, political philosophy, ethics and education are dealt with as distinct disciplines. One cannot proceed far in any of these disciplines without coming up against the need of making assumptions which belong to one or more of the others. That fact however has not deterred the process of specialization in the normative science of human life. The effect of

this misplaced division of labor has been to rob each of the foregoing disciplines of the main requisite to their effectiveness as guides to human living, namely, their seeing life steadily and whole.

It is necessary to do for our day what Aristotle did for his. He organized his studies of the normative problems of human life around a central fact which he regarded as ~~destructive~~^{distinctive} of that life. But we do not need to follow him in regarding that particular fact as distinctive of human life and therefore as the one to be made central in our study of the normative problem of human life. Aristotle defined man as a "political animal." To him what differentiated man from other creatures was the fact that he formed states. The state was therefore the central fact around which Aristotle formulated his ideas concerning ethics, education and religion (in the sense of the collective expression of the people who constituted the state.) Socrates and Plato before him had the same conception of the place of the state in human life. This notion of the human differentia may be described as native to the Greek outlook on life.

The effect of human experience since Aristotle's days and of the Judeo-Christian tradition which has become part of the psychology of the western man has been to single out a different fact as ~~des-~~^{des-}~~tructive~~^{tructive} of human life, and therefore as the only one around which to organize all that pertains to directing it to its proper goal. That fact is that man is the only creature that is dominated not merely by the will to live, but the will to live abundantly, the will to make the most out of life, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This human phenomenon is the will to salvation. More even than being a (p.6) man is .

Instead of treating the normative problem of human life viewed organically under the head of "politics," we should do so under the head of "Soterics."

The evolution from the will to live to the will to salvation is itself part of the general evolution from consciousness to self-consciousness. By self-consciousness I do not mean merely the awareness of one's self in the narrow sense of the term. I refer to that widening of our horizon of knowledge concerning the world and ourselves which makes it possible for us to recall past situations in which we figured, and to imagine possible situations in which we might figure as a consequence of our actions. The knowledge and understanding of all that is involved in any situation, ~~what~~ whether we ~~give~~ figure in it or not, grow with the growth in specific information of phenomena and their relationship. From that standpoint it would be idle to deny that man has progressed especially during the recent centuries.

It is in the light of this progress in knowledge and in the growth of self-consciousness that we should study the development of the will to salvation. In the earliest stages of human life, for the most part prehistoric which we have to reconstruct in the same way as we do the mental life of our own infancy, man lives from day to day. More than that might be more than his awakening mind is able to remember or figure out consciously. At that stage he acts for the most part under the drive of impulse or instinct, which is the name we give to the form which the will to live takes on in sub-human creatures. Already at that stage he has speech. With speech which probably possesses the type of mentality of a ^{man} three or four year old child/imaginative peoples the world with spirits or demons. He has not yet attained a sufficient awareness of his own being to ascribe personality to those demons. That does not prevent him from reacting to them in the light of what he expects from them, harm or good. In that prepersonal stage of his relationship to them he engages in actions to avert the harm he fears from them or to attract the good he thinks they can render

him. The term by which we now designate such action is magic.

Then comes the stage when as a result of growth in knowledge, man becomes aware of himself as a personality. This leads to his treating the demons likewise as personalities. The demons come to be known then, or are later identified as gods. The important thing is that a qualitative change takes place in man's relationship to the demons as soon as he becomes sufficiently self-conscious to think of himself as a person. Simultaneously with this change in man's relationship to the spirits or demons, and as a result of his growth in self-consciousness, he becomes aware of the different consequences to alternative courses of action. He begins to experience the meaning of choice and to become aware of differences in quantity and quality of life. This is the beginning of the awareness of salvation and of man's exercise of the will to salvation.

It is natural then for man simultaneously with his personalization of the demons to ascribe to them the ability to help him to attain or to withhold from him the better quality and the greater quantity of his life. Whereas the demon answered to the will to live and was the power that made for the fulfilment of life assuming that it was a friendly demon, the god answered to the will to salvation and was the power that made for the achievement of salvation. By the same token the magical practices which were at first engaged in merely to help man secure his elementary necessities, food, shelter, health, etc., are continued in this second stage, but they take on together with the very necessities which they help to secure the character of something more than mere means to living. They become the means to living the better and richer life. Thus the magic rites become religious rites and means to salvation.

The next stage in the development of consciousness is attained when man acquires enough knowledge of the world and of himself to conclude that the life abundant which he envisions is maintainable in this world. He regards this world as irredeemably bad and his body as the seat of all that is evil in him. Salvation then comes to mean a state of bliss in the life hereafter and in a world differently constituted from the present one.

Corresponding with the growth in self-awareness and in the notion of salvation ~~in~~ is growth in the conception of a god. The function of a god comes to be mainly that of helping man to secure immortality and bliss in the hereafter. Again the magic rites which, from being means to fulfilling the will to live have become means to salvation, undergo a second transformation and become means to the deepened concept of salvation. The original practices ~~xxxxx~~ associated with eating the animal that was supposed to harbor the demon whose power the primitive hunter needed to help him in the chase reappear in the orphic rites as means of becoming identified with the god who has the power of bestowing immortality upon those that enter into communion with him.

The Torah taken in its literal sense reflects the second of the foregoing stages when the Jews had attained sufficient self awareness to distinguish between a god and a demon, to recognize the difference between life and life abundant and to give to the original magic rites the significance of religious rites. By the third century B. C. the Jews together with the rest of the environing society had achieved further self awareness. Life abundant seemed to them unrealizable in this world. The discrepancy between the theory of reward and punishment and the actualities of life contributed to the conviction that salvation was unattainable in this world. From that moment on the God of the Torah came to be chiefly the giver of immortality and the study of Torah and the mizvot to be regarded as a means to the attainment of a share

in the world to come. This new interpretation may not have become recognizable before the Pharisees came to be identified as a distinct group.

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Tuesday, November 5, 1940

What is the principle on which we should act whenever we are divided by different desires, interests and ideals? Our desires advise us, let us say, to spend our days in ease and pleasure, our interests propose to us to pursue some objective that would give us power, and our ideals advise us to dedicate ourselves to some unpopular cause.

The striking fact that we can at the same time be both divided and united, divided by these desires, interests and ideals and yet united in experiencing them as part of our very selves is a miracle which flies in the face of the logical principle that a thing can and cannot be at the same time. It is a miracle like this which justifies Hegel's logic of becoming.

This miracle is also an interesting subject for ontology. Who is that "we" which is spoken of here as being both united and divided? Is the "ego" in each of us nothing but the sum of desires, interests and ideals or something more than their sum? It is difficult to conceive or experience the assumption that the "ego" is nothing but the sum of desires, interests, ideals, for then we could never experience the sense of unity. The desires do not entertain the interests, nor the interests the desire, etc. Only something that is more than they could hold all of them. What is this that can hold all of them, if not the Power that makes for life -- not ourselves and yet ourselves? Which somehow strives to reconcile these various and conflicting drives? It is at this very point that the self and the Power that makes for keeping that self integrated meet, and therefore the point at which we actually experience the reality of God.

Ethically the question which concerns us every time we are torn by conflicting desires, interests and ideals is: Is there any norm for what is to constitute the right kind of decision upon which we can be said to be acting ethically?

Perhaps by making use of the method resorted to by Plato in the beginning of the Republic we might find the correct answer. He uses the organization of the state as the model on which we should organize our individual lives (369). The moot question in the philosophy of the state is: On what principle shall the will of the state be formed? The answer is: on the principle of the will of the majority. That is the principle of democracy. No lawful government is possible unless the majority have the power to translate their will into action and unless the minority submit willingly to the majority. A state cannot possibly wait with its action until there is unanimity. If it were to do that, it would never act. What makes the action of the majority not only a matter of might but also ~~in~~ of right is that the might of the majority is assumed to be in line with the "will of God" or of the Power that makes for righteousness. In case, however, a minority manages to terrorize the majority and to seize the reigns of government, we have tyranny. Tyranny is ethically to be condemned because as the expression of the will of the minority it cannot be in keeping with the "will of God" and is bound to defeat the cause of righteousness. In all of this argument "God" is viewed only ethically. No attempt will here be made to square this conception of "God" which permits of his being in a sense defeated by the tyrannous power of the minority with the conventional conception of God as all powerful.

The foregoing suggests what happens in (p.9) in the individual ego when he is divided by conflicting desires, interests or ideals. Each of these represents a certain amount of power. How great that amount is is determined by the maximum of life realizable by the individual

from the standpoint of his abilities and circumstances. Under normal conditions the action finally taken by the individual is the result of a majority decision. It is not to be expected that all of the conflicting desires, interests etc. should actually consent to a particular line of action. The principle and method of democracy obtain in the government of the self as in the government of the state. When that happens the person acts ethically because such government of the self expresses the "will of God" or of the Power that makes for salvation. When, however, the desires, let us say, manage to assert their power and to render impotent the powers of the interests and ideals, there is inner tyranny, the conduct is unethical and the will of the Power that makes for salvation is flouted. The result is the loss of salvation.

A most difficult and yet a most important principle we should reckon with in all matters pertaining to salvation is that it is necessary to regard the Power - not ourselves - that makes for salvation as only implied in whatever men sincerely regard as salvation and as making for it and not as actually identified with it.

Thus when we are dealing with a religious tradition which was held to have been divinely revealed we actually encounter the tendency that prevailed in the past to identify whatever had to do with salvation as the actual will and functioning of godhood. Hence the dogmatic attitude which characterized the ancients in their outlook on life. When experience proved that what was identified as divine did not make for salvation, or when the conception of salvation became such that the traditional means could no longer be viewed as furthering it, the reaction against such identification made itself felt in the complete negation of godhood. The effort to build up theories of life and conduct without reference to godhood gave rise to various political and ethical systems of thought.

An alternative to complete negation of godhood or to ignoring it altogether in the treatment of the problems of human life and conduct is the one suggested in the foregoing principle. That principle is that the limitations of the human mind are such that it can perceive godhood only by implication but not by identification. One does not have to note the case of godhood to learn this concerning the limitations of the human mind. Take the case of rightness. There is many a problem where the human mind finds itself at wits' end to know what is the right thing to do. Does this inability to be certain as to what the right is justify us in assuming that the right is an illusion? The need to act necessarily compels us to select one course of action as the right one. We not only act upon it, but expect others to do likewise. To make sure that the course of action thus chosen will be generally adopted, we tend to identify it as the will of God or of conscience as the voice of God. This is a mistake and liable to lead to harmful consequences. The view we should take in all matters of right, which have become law, is that the exigencies of life demand that we decide upon a particular course of action. Being limited by natural lack of what would give us complete knowledge of all factors which enter into any problem of right or wrong, we have to act on the basis of all the available knowledge and exercise to the utmost the will to avoid the wrong and to do what is right. That attitude and its outcome imply that in the measure we adopt or the course of action we set up as just is the Power - not ourselves - that makes for righteousness or for salvation. But we have no right to take the position that the measure or course of action should be identified as actually the expression of God's will.

The relevance of the foregoing distinction helps us to evaluate a situation like that presented by the case of Macintosh vs. United States (283 V.S. 605-635). Prof. S. C. Macintosh of Yale University Divinity

School was denied citizenship because he had refused to declare himself willing to bear arms in any future war in which the nation might be engaged. He had reserved to himself the right to decide whether a war in which the U.S. was engaged was a righteous war, in which case only he would consent to bear arms. The contention of Justice Sutherland who expressed the majority opinion was that when Macintosh spoke of putting his allegiance to the will of God above his allegiance to the government he meant "to make his own interpretation of the will of God the decisive test which shall conclude the government and stay its hand." Sutherland's reply is "Though we are a Christian people...also, we are a nation with a duty to survive. (We must therefore) go forward upon the assumption, and safely can proceed upon no other, that unqualified allegiance to the Nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the land as well as those made for war as those made for peace, are not inconsistent with the will of God." Macintosh lost his case because he refused to identify himself with any particular group which conscientiously objected to war. He thus did not recognize either the public or institutionalized conscience as authoritative to him. This he could do only because he regards his own conscience not merely as implying godhood but as the expression of godhood. If he is indeed so sure of that voice being God's, the loss of citizenship can scarcely mean to him penalty. On the contrary, it should be to him a trial of faith, from which trial he in all likelihood came forth all the more convinced that he was right and that he was acting in accordance with the will of God.

But the average person is hardly in a position to be so certain that his conscience articulates the actual will of God. Nor is it possible to set up any society in which every one or even a large number of people would rely upon the dictates of their own individual consciences as articulating the actual will of God. Such certainty on

the part of individuals would lead to anarchy. The only alternative is to resort to such formulation of what is right as is arrived at by the orderly processes of custom, discussion and final incorporation into law of the crystallized sentiment of the public. There exist at present two types of institutionalized consciences: that of the state and that of the church. The church to a large extent still retains the dogmatic attitude in that it claims that its conscience is the actual expression of God's will. Not so the state. Being a secular institution it could not advance such claims. Hence all that it does claim, from the standpoint of divine sanction, is that so far as it is possible for human beings to arrive at a knowledge of what is right, it has employed every possible means to arrive at such knowledge. Having done that, it ~~can~~ can conscientiously claim that whatever it has adopted as legal and binding upon its citizens implies the existence of a Power that makes for salvation. If the church were wise, it would reconstruct its traditional attitude and adopt an attitude similar to that of the state. This means that it would have to give up the principles of supernaturalism and authoritarianism and adopt the principles of secularism and democracy. Should there arise then a conflict between the institutionalized conscience of the church and that of the state, there would have to be worked out a modus vivendi between them. From the standpoint of social progress, nothing could be more desirable than the development of a real spiritual check on the arbitrary power of the state.

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Wednesday, November 6, 1940

The adjoining entry was written at 2:30 A.M. when I could not sleep on account of joyous excitement over the reelection of Roosevelt. For America and for the Jews I thank God. (p. 12)

In the attempt to approach the problem of salvation or making the most of life in a spirit of science nothing should be further from our minds than the preconceived notion that such an approach is expected to yield exact knowledge of our objective and of the specific means to its attainment. The scientific character of a particular approach to subject matter is not determined by the actual results achieved through it as by the passion for truth and objectivity uninfluenced by prejudice, authoritarianism and wishful thinking. It is evident that it is impossible to investigate, observe, infer and generalize when we study mental, social and spiritual phenomena in the same way that we do when we study physical phenomena which lend themselves to quantitative measurement. Yet both types of phenomena can be studied in a scientific spirit. Whereas the study of physical phenomena yields us, as a rule, affirmative knowledge, the study of mental, social and spiritual phenomena yields us for the most part negative knowledge. The mistaken attitude that negative knowledge, knowledge of what we cannot know, is of little positive value, is probably the main reason for the failure to apply the scientific approach to the problems of human life. This is why those problems are in much the same state of incomprehensibility as they were when first broached. We must realize that the only time we shall ever get to understand how to deal with the problems of human life is when we shall have definitely marked off the areas in it which must remain terra incognita, so long as the human mind is what it is. We shall begin to deal with life intelligently only when we come to realize how much in our general outlook on life and in our dealings with one another we must not count on certainty but must rather be satisfied with hypotheses and postulates which we must count upon as justifying themselves by their consequences and not as demonstrable propositions.

(See quotation from M(p.12)

Ethics 1904G in Smith's Beyond

Conscience, p.185) cf. T. V. Smith *ibid.* p. 314.)

One of the principal contributions that soterics can make to the problems of ethics is to indicate what constitutes validation of ethical values and ideals and where to seek it. Ethics is concerned with "assertions that something ought to be which is not, or that something which is ought not to be, or that something which is ought to be otherwise than it is." T. V. Smith (ibid 168) raises the question: "Can these claims be validated and how?" Validation means for him demonstration of the rightness of ethical values on grounds other than their successful working. He does not make clear the affirmative aspect of the validation he seeks. Basically, he still labors under the philosophical tradition which has found it necessary to dichotomize life into power and right, instead of viewing life as divided between neutral power and power conscious of the purpose to make the most out of life. Ethical values and ideals are not like scientific generalizations of fact. They are assertions of the will to make the most out of life. When we assert that something ought to be which is not we do so because we feel we can get more out of life than is being gotten out of it. It is because we can that we ought. This thesis of Guyan is in need of reiteration. But this only the first step. The more difficult and important one is which of the things that we can do actually makes for more life, and how large a unit of life should we reckon with in determining abundance of living? This is where soterics touches upon problems which have hitherto found no place in ethics.

Modern political philosophy and philosophy of law are so based on the theory of social contract. This does not mean that social contract is regarded as a method which was ever actually employed to organize human society. It means that whatever has to do with society, i.e. with the relations of the individual to the group, or of lesser groups to the group as a whole, proceeds from the hypothetical assumption

that what holds a society together is the principle of voluntary surrender by each individual of whatever places him at an advantage over others to the group as a whole and his receiving in return whatever share of the advantage that accrues to the group as a whole he is, in the opinion of the group, entitled to. The social contract theory is an excellent illustration of the fact that when we deal with a situation in the spirit of "as if" we are not just making believe. It means that we are exploiting the possibilities of a situation instead of ignoring them. This is just what dealing with a situation from the valuational standpoint generally means. It is in this sense that "God" and "salvation" are like "social contract" not finished static realities but indispensable hypotheses for making the most out of life.

To realize how the assumption of social contract is indispensable to the maximum good to be derived from society we need but remember what social contract sought to offset. It sought to offset the notion that society was merely the enlargement of family and therefore an outgrowth of blood kinship. The significance of the step taken by mankind when it liberated itself from the notion of society as rooted in blood kinship is seldom sufficiently stressed or fully appreciated. That step meant that human personality had achieved a sufficient degree of development to possess interests and ideals which could not be realized within the social structure based on kinship and which called for a new type of social structure. The social framework of the family came to be felt as hampering the possibilities of expanding life. Greater abundance and richer quality of life demanded the social framework based on social contract. Hence the validation of social contract as the basis of society. The difference between kinship as validation and social contract as validation is analogous to the difference between the will to live and the will to make the most of life, between the conscious and the self conscious, between the merely biological and the human.

From that point on, the problem is purely and simply how to make whatever machinery society sets up contribute to the purpose of abundant life which is the original validation of the social contract. The political theorists, however, as a rule miss the pragmatic implication of social contract, i.e. its relationship to life abundant or salvation. They involve themselves in logical abstractions concerning the jurisdiction of government or the infallibility of the general will, instead of simply considering in direct fashion what kind of governmental machinery is best calculated to help the citizens achieve salvation.

A fact which is seldom noted is that no principle, law or rule, whether in legislation, code or ethics, ~~etc~~ whether human or divine can be so formulated as to fit accurately any particular conduct situation either for purposes of guidance before the act or judgment after the act. The reason for this is that no two particular conduct situations can be absolutely alike. On the other hand, a principle or law must necessarily refer to what is common to two or more particulars. By its very nature therefore, it must disregard the differentia which marks off the particular. Since the principle or law thus leaves an element in the particular unreckoned with, every particular conduct situation contains an element unprovided for by a general law or principle. This means that in human conduct as in art principles, laws and rules can at best be approximations both from the standpoint of guidance and judgment or evaluation. This unprovided for element either in human conduct or in art is what gives to both a place for the human being in which to be creative.

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Thursday, November 7, 1940

The crucial problem in soterics is what we are to understand by life abundant, maximum life, salvation. The only way to answer this question is to realize that we are not called upon to define life. Life can only be identified; it can not be defined. All definition is naming the genus to which the object defined belongs as species. Life is sui generis; hence it cannot be defined. But if it is to possess this distinctive quality or character of being abundant, maximal, soteric ~~and desirable~~ it is in need and capable of definition.

It is important to identify the life, the particular quality or character of which is to be set up both as the goal to strive for and as the criterion of the rightness of our conduct. That life is specified by the life of the body, lived in human association in the physical world in which we live at present and which is to be governed by the same natural laws as at present. The reason for stating this identification of life is that for the last twenty centuries the human mind in the western world has been laboring under the misapprehension that the life of the body in this physical world of ours as at present constituted is hardly deserving of the name "life." The life of the body is qualitatively and quantitatively so different from the true life which is possible only when man casts off his "moral evil" that only our inability to make our words correspond to reality permits it to be designated life. As against this misapprehension we must definitely be prepared to stake all our hopes and prospects of maximum life or salvation upon the life of the body.

This commitment involves two things: 1) We shall not regard any goal worth striving for that would view the negation of the bodily life, of its health and natural desires as essential as an end in itself; 2) since our bodies are subject to death, the bodily life which is to be the goal worth striving for must be the one which is carried on from

generation to generation. This second implication, though part of our identification of life, would not occur to us, were it not for the particular character of quality of life which alone can constitute for us a goal or criterion. That character or quality is abundance and salvation upon the proper understanding of which the success of soterics hinges.

Life is abundant or soterical to the extent that it moves in the direction of continued awareness of unity in diversity.

Without attempting to define life, we may identify as one of its indispensable characteristics unity in variety. The single living cell is not homogeneous but differentiated into nucleus and protoplasm which interact as a unit. (I shall not enter upon the question whether the atom is not for that reason a living thing. The unity in variety is indispensable to life, but there is probably more to life than that.) Life is enhanced in quantity and quality, the greater the diversity of the parts and the more marked and intense the unity that holds them together. The emergence of consciousness in the life process is very evidently the emergence of a more intensive unity which functions holding together a more differentiated diversity. The will to life, when it attains consciousness becomes the will to unity. In the human being consciousness achieves another qualitative advance in becoming self-consciousness. That is because the process of differentiation is carried to so high a point that the unity which is to hold together the parts must achieve a new kind of intensity. The differentiation which takes place in man is the result of his more complex physical structure especially the nervous, and perhaps also the glandular system, which makes possible longer memory and therefore more vivid imagination. With memory and imagination at work, the inherited instincts or tendencies become differentiated. The fact is often misstated when it is said that the human being has more instincts than the sub-human.

The truth is not that he has more but that in him the same inherited tendencies are infinitely more differentiated. His life must therefore manifest an infinitely more intensive unity to hold together the inherited tendencies with their infinite differentiations and resulting variations.

The goal which human beings set up whenever they function best as human beings, or in common parlance, whenever they act most wisely, and the criterion by which they then evaluate their conduct may be reduced to the formula of "life abundant" or "maximum life." That can mean only one thing: the assurance that the process of increasing unity in diversity will be carried on forever, despite temporary setbacks.

Unity in diversity as an object of knowledge is meaning. When therefore we speak of life not from the standpoint of its inherently unknowable essence, but from that of the quality we know by and what it to continue as, we speak of it as having meaning. Whatever contributes to the growth of unity in diversity contributes to life and is not only desirable but obligatory, for that is obligatory which can enhance life. Whatever retards that growth is evil and should be eliminated.

Truth, goodness and beauty are phases of unity in diversity. They are phases of that which is an end in itself, since life is an end in itself. We may regard each as an end in itself provided we remember at the same time that it is only a phase of life and not the whole of it. Life has meaning when these three phases are present.

Whatever emphasizes unity at the expense of diversity, or vice versa tends to destroy life and whatever destroys life destroys its meaning. The ancients were right in sensing that death in destroying life destroys life's meaning even while life lasts, because when life becomes self-aware it must be aware of itself as never needing, as embracing in itself the infinite multiplicity which it reduces to a unity. But the ancients were mistaken in believing that the only way in which

the life of the individual could retain meaning was by surviving death as the same individual life. The truth is that the individual can easily be reconciled to death and experience his life as having meaning even if it fail to survive as the same individual life. All that the individual essentially wants is to feel assured that what he valued most in his life will not end with him but will be taken up by his survivors and incorporated into the life producing process, thereby giving immortality to that which gives unity to the diversity in his life, or to that which gives meaning to his life. This is in fact the reinterpretation of the traditional belief in personal immortality.

Santayana's entire "Realm of Essence" is none other than the realm of unity in diversity. He would probably treat unity in diversity as the source of all human illusions, but I gather that "the forms of elusion by which we have been deceived" are not themselves illusions but veritable realities that survive the family as they antedate the appearance of the whole visible order."

"Conscience" says T. V. Smith (ibid 245) as the penalty of an active animal, is the integrator of his energies par excellence; and the only way man could be one rather than many, which latter is to say none, is to commit himself to attention to less than he sees. While this necessity becomes most obviously crucial when we leave the field of consciousness and enter the field of action, nevertheless inside consciousness, conscience alone makes possible the integration, that is the being, of the self."

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Friday, November 8, 1940

The following is a tentative description of the scope of soterics:

When the will to live attains in the human being that point of development at which it becomes the will to make the most out of life (= the will to life abundant or to salvation) it precipitates the belief

in self, society (clan or nation) and the self, society and God come to represent both the origin and the goal of the urge to salvation. They are the common movers, the final cause of everything in the human being that contributes to his salvation. They are thus the source of soteric values which validate the pragmatic.~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

The conceptualized forms in which these three beliefs have come down to us are, despite all attempts to modernize them still those of the long past when the laws of cause and effect and the uniformity of nature were unknown.

Advances in the human sciences call for a more critical examination of those beliefs than has hitherto been attempted, with a view to discovering their mutual relationship as well as establishing, if possible, their objectivity.

By the same token it will be necessary to arrive at some principles which would aid us in reformulating or correcting the existing norms of life abundant or salvation. Hitherto those norms were bound up with the traditional concepts of self society (clan or nation) and God. With those concepts undergoing a change it will be necessary to state anew what is to guide us in our idea of the life abundant or salvation and of the means to its attainment.

So far no more illuminating principle ~~has~~ to what is to constitute for us salvation has been articulated than that stated in Plato's writings and further sharpened by Aristotle. It is the principle of "health" or wholeness, which they qualified by the principle of justice or harmony. The way to make the most out of life is to avail oneself of all the elements that go into the making of life, with due regard to such harmony among the elements as would enable all of them to be accorded the maximum measure of consideration possible under the given circumstances. To that end, it is highly important that every person know

himself sufficiently to be able to live by that principle. It is at least as necessary to have some kind of frame of reference by which we might orient ourselves with regard to the elements that go into the making of human life, as it is to have an elementary knowledge of geography and of the astronomical conception of the universe. The former is infinitely far more important for the regulation of our conduct and inner life than the latter. Such a frame of reference, though it would be the barest outline of the elements that enter into the making of our inner life, could be made as integral a part of the average person's education as a knowledge of human anatomy. It is by no means any less essential. With increased knowledge/^{that} soteric frame of reference could be filled in with details which would make it more specific and helpful.

That frame of reference is one which classifies all social values into 1) values of purpose, and 2) values of endorsement. The values of purpose are those of the 1) id, 2) super-ego, 3) ego. These correspond to values of 1) elemental impulses, 2) socialized/^{restraints,} ~~impulses~~ 3) intelligence. The values of endorsement are 1) self, 2) society 3) cosmos (god). These elements constitute all the materials of the mind. Having them thus spread out and classified for us, it should be easy to live up to the excellent formula prescribed by T. V. Smith (ibid 279): "All the materials of the mind must be enjoyed without discrimination before we can fruitfully discriminate them."

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Saturday Night, November 9, 1940

Is consciousness of self, society or God a causal factor? The behaviorists find no need for consciousness or mind to account for any phase of human life or conduct. They assume that, given a sufficient knowledge of the physico-chemical composition of any living being, including the human, it would be possible to account for all the mani-

festations of life on the basis of purely physical dynamism, including the very explanation, right or wrong, of all those manifestations. To the behaviorists, therefore, the very question whether consciousness is an efficient cause is meaningless, since "consciousness" is a term for something that doesn't exist. On the other hand to philosophic idealists, the question is superfluous, since everything exists in and for consciousness and is constituted of the very stuff of consciousness. It is only for the realistic dualist that the question has meaning. For him both matter and mind are real and interact, though he does not profess to understand how they do. He simply finds that neither kind of monism, materialistic or idealistic, makes existence as intelligible as does the hypothesis of dualism. On that hypothesis there are two kinds of causes, efficient and final. (Material causes belong to efficient, especially when we learn to see matter in its modern comprehensive sense of energy, and formal cause belongs to final.) Just as little as we can get to the bottom of matter, so little, if not less, can we get to the bottom of life and of consciousness. That being the case, we shall probably never get to the bottom of how matter on the one hand, and life and consciousness, on the other, interact. But so long as we shall have to reckon with them as ultimates, we shall have to recognize as ultimate the two kinds of causes, efficient and final.

Final causes are awareness of future or unrealized situations functioning as inhibitions or impulses to physical or mental activity. Both the awareness themselves and the effects which they exercise are the will to live in action. When formulated as concepts. they are termed "values." All values are, accordingly, articulations of the awareness of some relationship of any thing, person, event, situation, etc. to the will to live. Insofar as the articulation of awareness goes further in bringing about changes than awareness as such, values are very definitely a causal factor.

But what exactly is articulation of awareness of relationship of any thing, etc. to the will to live? How does it take place? The will to live, in the process of being aware of the thing or person etc. that matters to it splits up as it were into two parts. One part attends to the thing, or person, etc. that part gives rise to values or purpose. The other part precipitates itself into onlooker. The onlooker is either self, society or God, any of the two or all ~~of~~ the three. Whether the onlooker be single, dual or trinitarian, it gives rise to values which either endorse or reject the values of content. Without the backing of the onlooker, the values of content are not ready to function as final causes. We must, therefore, conclude that the consciousness of self, society or God is a causal factor.

Let us take as an illustration the communist ideal of a classless society. This illustration should be particularly pertinent, because Communism denies categorically that consciousness of self, society or Cosmos (=God) is a causal factor. In the light of the foregoing analysis, the ideal of a classless society is an articulation of the will to live the maximum life as experienced by those discontented with the present social order. This ideal gives rise to values of purpose in terms of economic conditions that are and those to be. These values of purpose, if they are to be effective, must reckon with the economic conditions actual and potential, from the standpoint of elemental instincts, social habits, and intelligent adjustment of means to ends. If the results of such reckoning meet with the approval of the onlooker - self, classless society, and the materialistic metaphysics (the cosmos or God of communism) faith and knowledge reinforce wish and hope. This constitutes a full articulation of an awareness of the relationship of a particular combination of eventualities, that goes by the name of classless society to the will to salvation of the communist party.

What T. V. Smith says of social order applies with even greater force to salvation. (Cf. *ibid* 315 sq.) "Equality is the prescription at which we arrive as the principle of social order. We arrive at it, beginning with the internal; we arrive at it, beginning with the external: it is the fruit of the confluence of all our extremes." He then quotes as proof the following maxims: Kant - every person be treated as an end and not as means; Bentham - "each to count for one and no more than one; Sidgwick - each part of one's own conscious life, future ~~pleasure~~ ^{pleasure} as much as the present, must be considered equally, if one is to have upon his self-seeking the blessing of nationality. Thus, ~~Thus~~ according to Smith equalitarianism is the last word of conscience.

In terms of the soteric frame of reference conscience is the trinitarian source of values of endorsement. Equalitarianism, as an ideal is the same as classlessness except that it is broader in application, since it is intended to apply to internal values as well as to social values. It is the one value of purpose derived thus from the level of intelligence that would insure the maximum utilization of life's potentialities. It is for that reason the one most important to be reckoned with, if we wish to attain salvation.

It must be remembered, however, that the principle of equalitarianism must be applied not only to the values of purpose. It should also be applied to the three categories of value of endorsement. The self, the nation (or society) and God must, so to speak, be accorded an equal degree of authority. The tendency to accord supremacy to one or the other must, so to speak, be accorded an equal degree of authority. The tendency to accord supremacy to one or the other of these categories is responsible for the various distortions of social life known as anarchy, statism and clericalism. The ideal social order is one in which all the three have an equal voice.

The mistake which underlies any ethical system based on the assumption that the right is self-validating derives from the assumption that rightness is something absolute or inherent instead of being relative to a goal or purpose. The only goal or purpose relative to which anything can be ethically right or good is salvation or the maximum realization of the creative possibilities in the individual and society. Thus the ethical principle of equalitarianism regarded as absolute or inherent cannot be validated as T. V. Smith's argument of his book would necessarily lead us to conclude in the sense that its inherent rightness cannot be demonstrated. Nay more, it can not be validated ever in the sense of receiving steadfast obedience. The reason is that equalitarianism runs counter to nature, which creates men most unequal in strength, cunning, intelligence and forbearance. Rousseau's statement: "It is precisely because the force of circumstances tends continually to destroy equality that the force of legislation should always tend to its maintenance," sounds purely arbitrary. No wonder Nietzsche had no difficulty in stressing the very opposite assumption. He had at least the argument (specious though it be) about nature's method of having the fittest survive through struggle. Actually, however, whether we set up as principle that rightness consists in fighting nature or following her ways, we are merely affirming that rightness is absolute because there is nothing in the concept of nature - however we conceive it, whether as reason in the abstract with the stoics and Spinoza or as brute force, with the modern biologists -- to suggest whether we should imitate her or flout her. When however we set up as our goal the maximum realization of life's potentialities, the principle of equality is validated by the empirical fact that it makes for more life and better life all around. It is as much both in line with and against nature as the making of a shelter to protect oneself against the inclemencies of the weather is both for and against nature. Like the latter equality justifies itself by the fact that it makes for the more abundant life than inequality.

Sunday, Nov. 10, 1940

Plato was mistaken when he identified life with power, by which he meant to make power the differentia of life. This seems so contrary to what we see all about us, that we wonder what Plato could have meant by regarding power as the very essence of life. All the forces of inanimate nature seem to indicate that power certainly exists without life, and that though it may be indispensable to life as matter is, it cannot constitute its differentia. Plato would have been the last to identify life with matter, despite the indispensability of matter to life. For an explanation we should perhaps take into account the tendency to animism or panpsychism which marked all early thinking about reality. In that case what we speak of an inanimate nature was to the ancients quite animate, and the forces of nature were assimilated by them to life. For that reason Plato could consistently identify life with power. (The above entry should be corrected. Plato said "The definition of being is simply power." (Sophist 244)).

In the present stage of our knowledge concerning the reducibility of matter to energy and the apparent identity of energy with life, we might be tempted to make life once more synonymous with power. There is one fact however about energy as such that is the antithesis of life, and that is the fact known as the increase of entropy. Energy runs down, life runs up. Life goes as it were against the steam of energy. It dams it up as it were into units called living beings. For a time. i.e. so long as they keep on growing the life forces turn back the inanimate energies on themselves. After a while there is a balance struck between the animate and the inanimate forces, and finally the latter get the upper hand and the living being begins to disintegrate.

If the foregoing is a true representation of what actually happens it should have an important bearing on the problems in soterics. It means that the differentia of the will to live is not "power" but "ought." Power is the actual or the is, the uninterrupted flow of energy. The "ought" reverses the process of the "is" or of power. Damming up the stream is an indication of another course to be taken by the stream, or of a diversion of its energies from its usual one to an unusual one. The "ought" utilizes the "is" or the given power. It would be meaningless without that power, but it changes its direction. This should throw light on the question of the relation of the "ought" to nature. If nature denotes for us only what is than the "ought" necessarily implies the introduction of something new or different from or even contrary to nature. Life as such is contrary to physical nature in that it violates the entropism of nature.

By the same token self-consciousness introduces into that larger nature which includes life a second "ought." The first "ought" is that which sets up life against the inanimate. The second "ought" is that which sets up maximum life or salvation against mere life. In mere life we have struggle and the law of the jungle. In human or self-conscious life the law of the jungle is countered by the law of righteousness and love. Nietzsche was mistaken in assuming that self-conscious life was entirely of the same nature as merely conscious life. He failed to realize that self-consciousness repeats on a higher level the process which life enacts in relation to the inanimate, self-consciousness, dam up, as it were, the forces of life and makes them operate in a new direction. Memory and imagination is the process of damming up the forces of life. Histories, ideals and conscience are the results of such damming up of the life forces and getting them to operate in the direction opposite to that which makes for entropy. The "ought" of man cannot dispense with the realities of nature, but

its essence consists in reversing the down going trend of the struggle for existence by introducing cooperation and the utilization of the maximum life giving potentialities in every human being. This urge of self-conscious life to salvation has found expression in the traditional virtues of justice and love.

Justice and love have been challenged, and the challenge has to be met. It is not only an occasional thinker that regards himself as exposing what he believes to be a sham in maintaining that justice and love are merely devices for self deception, if not for deceiving others to cover up egoism and the striving for power. There is something in each of us that rebels at the demands which justice and love make on us and we secretly wish we could openly cast off their yoke. We are therefore happy to come across a thinker like Nietzsche who articulates our revolt, especially since he did it in such grand style. Communism's challenge, though motivated by the very opposite kind of purpose from that which impelled Nietzsche, is also in some part due to the inner rebellion against the restraints, to say nothing of the duties, which justice and love impose on us. It is therefore important to vindicate, and if possible, to validate them. This is the significance of the soteric frame of reference. It helps us realize that justice and love are the most reasonable means to the attainment of maximum life, despite the very fact that they seem at times to run counter to life as such. Justice is only another name for the equality to be accorded to the values of purpose. Love is only another name for the unity in diversity to be striven after for the sake of the values of endorsement.

Accordingly, the organization of the book on soterics should be based on the frame of reference (I). After pointing out how the experience of the will to salvation gives objectivity to all social values

(= ethics, religion and politics) and can serve as the basis for an exhaustive classification of those values, it is necessary to take up in detail the discussion of the (II) values of content and (III) of the soteric values. The aim of that discussion should be to describe the prevailing tendencies to emphasize some of the values of purpose, content and of endorsement at the expense of the rest and to indicate what is necessary at the present time to restore the balance so that human life shall become "whole" or healthy.

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Tuesday, November 12, 1940

The soterical frame of reference with its sharp distinction between values of content purpose and values of salvation endorsement helps us to see clearly wherein T. V. Smith could have saved himself the trouble of writing his book to "minimize the prestige influence of conscientiousness." All values of content purpose to be such imply 1) an individual will to make the most out of life and 2) the possibility of eliciting the maximum out of the three categories (levels) of content purpose values by treating them with proper equality. The calculus by which one arrives in each instance at what answer to his conception of maximum is determined by a variety of factors, among which natural desires, personal habits and intelligence play the principal part. When the final decision is reached it is endorsed by that distinctive trinitarian element in the will to live the maximum life which is articulated in thought and speech ~~thereby~~ though not in inner experience, as self-society-cosmos. What is referred to as conscience is the hypostasis of the special part played by this trinitarian element in endorsing or rejecting any choice or decision with regard to the values of purpose. It is evident therefore that conscience is only a constitutional without any legislative authority.

All life is inherently the functioning of individual wills, and

every will is a will to power so as to possess the means to life. The will to salvation is the will to achieve power to a maximum degree. By itself there is nothing in power that is good or bad. The fact that the means to life exist to a limited degree and that there are many claimants to those means gives rise to conflict of wills. The important thing to bear in mind is that the values of purpose in which the individual will seeks to realize itself are themselves based upon the relationship of conflict and coordination, between the individual will and other wills. It is in the very process of choosing that the will to salvation becomes conscious of the trinitarian element, self-society-cosmos (God). Consciousness of that trinitarian element is consciousness of its functioning as conscience.

The real problem therefore is this: how far can the consciousness of the trinitarian element, self-society-cosmos, detach itself from the process of choosing or of calculating which the will to salvation engages in, so as to judge with maximum impartiality the true nature of the choice? Ideally it might attain sufficient detachment to be more than a rubber stamp to what the will, acting through the values of purpose, decides upon as the course to be taken. But as a rule it merely echoes the decisions arrived at on the basis of the values of purpose. The prestige which conscience enjoys is the prestige of an ideal attainment and not of an actually achieved ability. The point to be made therefore is that there is nothing sacrosanct to conscience as such but to the ideal of detachment. This applies likewise to the two elements of the trinity: society and cosmos (God). Enough crimes have been committed in the name of society (nation, class, humanity) and cosmos (God) to have minimized their prestige. Nothing is gained by the effort to show them up to be humbugs. The fact is that not ~~are~~ they are humbugs, but we are, and the reason we are is that we refuse them that detachment from our own desires, interests and ideals (values of purpose).

which presumably we grant them. But if we were really to grant them adequate detachment, we would have morals, politics and religion that could be depended upon to render true judgments on the choices of the will to salvation.

When do we presumably grant the self, society and cosmos the detachment that should qualify them to pass true judgment? Every time we ascribe to them objective reality that is independent of our transient desires, interests and ideals and regard them as surviving our individual will to live, the self as soul, society as some immortal group with a destiny of its own, the cosmos as God -- the three elements of the trinity that emerges from the process of choosing among the values of purpose, -- ^{are} ~~an~~ appealed to as the judges of the true meaning of life.

What is it that we want most? According to T. V. Smith it is "a genuinely free self in a genuinely voluntary society" (ibid 356). Such

Wednesday, November 13, 1940

formulation of salvation is inconceivable in any but a modern environment. It presupposes a background of democratic ideals and institutions which have to some extent at least given a foretaste of freedom. Without such background a human being is more likely to prefer being ordered about, if with the lack of freedom there is a greater degree of security or less need for exercising initiative than goes with the possession of freedom.

Moreover, it is a mis take to speak of freedom as something we want most. That would be to identify freedom with salvation. Freedom is only a condition which is most conducive to the attainment of salvation. What we want most is not the condition to attainment but the attainment itself.

Self-society-cosmos which generates the values of endorsement and make the final decision among the various values of purpose is the experiential mass (analogous to the apperceptive mass) which performs for all

moral choices or choices of the will to maximum life what the apperceptive mass performs for the vast number of sensations, ideas, feelings, etc. when it organizes them into knowledge.

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Saturday, November 16, 1940

Tentatively it appears that the values of content purpose as a whole come within the category of ethics, while the values of endorsement as a whole come within the category of religion. Both categories of values are the subject matter of education.

There seem also to be the following correspondences: between the values of the id and those of beauty; between the values of the super-ego and those of goodness; and between the values of the ego (intelligence) and those of truth.

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Thursday, November 21, 1940

It is some time since I ^{went} ~~went~~ on lecture tours. Any change in my routine comes hard to me. It was therefore not easy for me to resume giving out of town lectures which I did this week. The original engagement was for Detroit where I had been scheduled to speak on "The Jewish Religion of Tomorrow." Last week I received an invitation from Rabbi Jehudah Cohen, the director of the Hillel Foundation at Ann Arbor to speak under the auspices of the Foundation. I turned the matter over to Miss Weisman and she arranged that I speak there the Tuesday of this week on the afternoon before I was to speak at Detroit.

I was not satisfied with my experience at Ann Arbor. There I found a group of young people -- members of Avukah - who seemed interested in Judaism. But they were a mere handful, hardly half a dozen. The rest of the audience which consisted of about 75 people were a very heterogeneous group. I found it difficult to get into complete rapport with the audience while I spoke and I had no chance to do in any discussion after the lecture, because the people had to

rush off to supper.

Jehudah Cohen who has been in charge of the Hillel Foundation on the campus of the Michigan University this last year is a graduate of the JIR. For several years he directed the work at the Jewish Center of Los Angeles. He was in Detroit when I got into Ann Arbor, but I learned to know him after the lecture. He spoke to me the entire time he drove me back to Detroit for the lecture which I had been scheduled to give there. He strikes me as a very nice chap and as one who is deeply imbued with the philosophy of Reconstructionism. All the four sermons which he delivered on the High Holidays were devoted to the interpretation of Reconstructionism. From what he tells me there is considerable Reconstructionist sentiment throughout the country. I have known that all along, but the question is: what can be done to crystallize that sentiment?

In Detroit my lecture was very successful. I had an attendnace of about 300. It was a very representative and quite intellectual audience. Some of the important Yiddishists who are very active in Detroit were there and they brought the noted Yiddish poet Lavik with them. I was in good form both during the lecture and during the discussion which followed it.

I felt so good after that lecture that I accepted Rabbi Adler's invitation to address in Hebrew a group of Hebraists known as the Kevuzah. Originally I had turned ^{down} that invitation but under the influence of my exhilaration I withdrew my refusal. Strange to say the talk I gave on Wednesday morning, which dealt with the question of isolation vs. assimilation was worked up with very little effort and turned out to be successful from every standpoint. I have almost gotten over by this time the stage-fright feeling under which I had always labored when speaking in Hebrew to an adult audience.

After the Hebrew lecture I was given a luncheon at the Center by its executive Herman Jacobs and a number of other graduates of the Graduate School for Jewish Social Work. In my talk to them I urged them to constitute themselves into a Reconstructionist group for the purpose of mutual encouragement in the affirmative attitude toward Jewish life and of instituting the kind of religious services that would appeal to them. At present they are not identified with any religious group and are looked upon as secularists. Their influence on Jewish life beyond what they do professionally is at present almost nil. As a Reconstructionist group they could exert a very wholesome influence. Among those present were Mrs. Sobolof (nee Mazorfsky); her husband is head of Federation; Boxerman who is head of the Jewish council; Fleischman who is on the staff in the Center; Harold Silver, director of Jewish social services; Goldie Goldstein, case worker; Mr. & Mrs. Luchs. He is in charge of refugee resettlement work; and Franck, a member of the Center staff.

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Tuesday, November 26, 1940

Eureka! What is salvation? What is to constitute making the most of human life in terms of this-worldly existence? Various concrete goods have been suggested (and stated above, such as health, status, progeny, creativity, etc. These, no doubt, are essential and should be striven after. But suppose one misses them, has he necessarily missed salvation? In that case some of the greatest spiritual heroes would have to be accounted as complete failures and as having achieved far less salvation than the most unworthy and self-complacent Philistine. Apparently the specific goods by themselves cannot be regarded as salvation but rather as means to it, though not so essential as to be absolutely indispensable. We thus come back to the question: By what criterion shall we know when these or any other goods further salvation? To answer that we have to know what salvation is.

It seems to me that there can be but one answer. Salvation consists in experiencing the validation of the triad self-society-God. The values ^{of} endorsement (soteric values) which emanate from this ~~that~~ triad constitute that validation. As values of endorsement (soteric values) they are the final causes of the choice we make. The efficient causes of all our choices are the three sources of the values of interest (pragmatic values) viz: the id, the super-ego and the creative intelligence. This analysis coincides with Aristotle's conception of God as the final cause or unmoved mover. But what is more important is that it coincides with what we actually experience when life seems to be truly worthwhile. For it is then that the reality of self and society and God seems to be validated. To forfeit salvation to experience damnation is to experience the feeling that one's self is disintegrating, that society with its demands and ~~its~~ ideals are a fraud and that God is an illusion.

Here at last we have a conception of this worldly salvation by means of which it will be possible to coordinate all our thinking about ethics, religion and education. In order however to prevent the limitation of it to any arbitrarily preferred part of mankind, to any nation, race or church, it is necessary to supplement it with the following principle: It should be impossible for any one person to regard the reality of self-society-God as validated so long as there are human beings who are prevented by their fellows from having that reality validated in their lives.

Perhaps it is this second principle which accounts for the zeal to make converts which normally marks those who believe they have found the true way to salvation. There is to be sure an element of striving for power. But it cannot be altogether that. Something of the element of selflessness is undoubtedly present in the (p.26) or missionary's zeal. It is the feeling that one's own salvation is contingent upon the salvation of all other human beings.

Saturday night, November 30, 1940

The urge that impels man to make the most of his life and its potentialities in other words, to achieve salvation manifests itself also as the urge to modify the direction of brute nature. That direction is toward having the physically strong and cunning survive in the struggle against human and sub-human forces of destruction. When impelled by the urge to salvation aims to render as many human beings as possible survive and make the most of their lives despite handicaps, weaknesses and difficulties.

The manifestation of man's will to salvation takes the form of social idealism. The ideals of liberty, fraternity and equality and the insistence upon every man's inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are an expression of man's will to life abundant. It is a mistake therefore to identify them as pragmatic values. They are essentially soteric values. The mistake of Marxism is in conceiving them as pragmatic values. From that standpoint they can very easily be proved to be mere camouflage for class interests. But the trouble with Marxism is that it knows of no values other than pragmatic (political, economic and social) from a collective standpoint and values of pleasure and power (from an individual standpoint). This attitude of the Marxists is a reaction against the historic emphasis upon soteric values as the only real values and as independent of the pragmatic values.

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Monday, December 9, 1940

The difficulty of adjusting ourselves to the evolutionary conception of man, to the conception of man as having evolved from a lower species of creature is paralleled by the difficulty of accepting the evolutionary conception of ideas, i.e. the conception of ideas as evolving out of biological tendencies. This is especially the case

with the idea of God. According to the evolutionary conception of religion, man came to believe in God and to entertain various ideas concerning deity or godhood not as a result either of supernatural revelation or of ideational reflection. Having come into the world with numerous instinctive wants, he interpreted the world from the standpoint of those wants and thus came to believe in gods or God. For a god is that power which makes possible the satisfaction of an intrinsic want of human life. The more complex the wants became the more exalted the god that made their satisfaction possible. The ideas about the gods or God are the ideational aspects of the life process in which the experience of a want culminates in the belief in a power which satisfies that want.

The main difficulty in accepting this account of the origin and development of ideas is that it makes them merely instrumental in the satisfaction of wants, thereby rendering the objectivity of the content of the ideas of secondary importance. The question whether or not there is a God is from this standpoint of secondary importance as compared with the question whether the particular idea we have of God helps to make human life livable. This objection, however, need not be taken too seriously. Once we take life for granted as unquestionably real and objective, the conditions that render it possible and under certain circumstances abundant, are as objectively real as life itself. In fact, why not have such faith in the reality of life as to assume that those ideas which actually contribute to its abundance and enhancement do so by very reason of the fact that their content have objective validity. Surely mathematical ideas are an aid to life. Is it not essentially because they represent objective truth and are therefore a reliable guide to knowledge of the conditions that affect life and of what must be done with them to make them helpful to life in case they are not? This again does not mean that their

truth extends only as far as their practical utility. But it does mean that they possess practical utility insofar as they are objectively true. So that the nearer the ideas which have their origin in our instinctive needs, approach objective truth the more certain they are to help us make the most out of our lives. This coincidence of salvation with objective truth is perhaps the best assurance we have of the existence of a Power in the cosmos that makes for human salvation.

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Thursday, December 12, 1940

Last night the Seminary observed the 25th anniversary of Schechter's death. The exercises were described as a convocation with Faculties and Trustees (of whom there were only four including Mrs. Warburg.) The others were Sol Stroock, Hendricks and Nathan, the last two ^{are} nincompoops of Spanish Portuguese ancestry) all togged out in academic rags and boards with tassels. Finky spoke extemporaneously and well. But there was enough in what he said to indicate his tendency to falsify facts. I refer especially to the explanation he gave for Schechter's being as he put it "unhappy and lonely." According to F. the one and only reason Schechter was unhappy and lonely was that Judaism was being secularized. F. mentioned specifically the secularization of Jewish education. How false that explanation is one can realize on reading Bentwich's biography of Schechter. Bentwich does not quote Schechter's letter to Marshall in full. If he did there would be quite a scandal.

The same gang that made Schechter's life miserable later formed the American Jewish Committee which at present has a throttle hold on American Jewish life. I have sufficient circumstantial evidence that it is trying to knife me and to sabotage Reconstructionism. The releases which have been sent out to a number of Anglo-Jewish periodicals under the masthead of "The Reconstructionist Viewpoint" are being

turned down. This, I am told, is the work of stooges of the American Jewish Committee, who see to it that nothing the Committee objects to is published in those periodicals.

The Federation leaders belong to the same tribe of Jewish fifth columnists. I started a hornet's nest with the editorial in the Reconstructionist entitled "A ^{Bad} Plea for a Good Cause" in which I (I gave the substance of the editorial to E. Kohn, which he then wrote out and I corrected) took Proskauer ^{to task} for sending out a two page letter appealing for Federation, in which there was no reference to Federation's being a Jewish institution, or that those to be helped were Jews. Only one to whom the term "Jewish" is synonymous with whatever he wants to escape from and forget could have allowed such a letter to go out over his name.

Among the first repercussions to that article was a telephone call to Chipkin from Willen. Willen is a highly paid (he is said to earn from 30,000 to 40,000 per year) Federation worker whose speciality is plying the richest Jews for funds. He ordered Chipkin who is listed among the editors to the Reconstructionist to write a letter repudiating the editorial. I say "ordered" because the same Willen is Roseman's right hand man in the Jewish Education Committee. It was Willen who had Roseman appointed to the chairmanship of that committee because Burke the execut~~or~~ of the Friedsam estate relied entirely on Willen as to the disposition of the million dollars left by Friedson for some Jewish charity. Chipkin being an employee of the Jewish Education Committee can therefore be ordered around by Willen. At first Chipkin consented to follow orders, but on second thought he realized apparently at Dushkin's suggestion, that he would stultify himself if he were to write such a letter to the Reconstructionist.

Another illustration of how systematically these fifth columnists are trying to sabotage all affirmative Jewish efforts is what the JEC is

is doing with a pictorial they are getting out for the Jewish schools. It is called "The World Over." Recently there appeared in it a biography of Brandeis. I was told that the fact that he was a Zionist was not even mentioned.

Finkelstein is one of those who talk in superlative terms about things concerning which (or people concerning whom) they have no positive convictions.

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Saturday night, December 14, 1940

The distinction between pragmatic and soteric values makes it possible to distinguish between the prayer of the unenlightened and the prayer of the enlightened. The prayer of the unenlightened aims to obtain values of the pragmatic order; the prayer of the enlightened aims to achieve the values of the soteric order -- the integrity of self, the inherent worth of humanity, the godhood of the cosmos.

The foregoing distinction might also explain the difference between the lower and the higher type of morality as expounded by Bergson in his "Morality and Religion."

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Tuesday, December 24, 1940 (All the preceding entries should be corrected in keeping with this one.)

It looks as though I shall have to rename the different categories of values. Those I have been calling "pragmatic values" and purposive values I shall henceforth designate as content values, in that they constitute the content of living. The urges of instinct, habit and intelligence are the very material of human life. Next come the "formal values." Truth, goodness and beauty. They constitute the forms which the various contents of life must assume if they are to render life satisfactory or worthwhile. What being worth-

while means is indicated by the final values, viz. self, society and God. Other and less technical terms than self, society and God as final values are the following: "a taste for life," "a reverence for life," "the sense of wonder at life," and a proper and reasonable attitude toward life." (terms employed by Lin Yutang).

The formal values are the criteria to which the functional values are to measure up if they are to yield the final values. Thus in the statement "Whatever else science may do, it certainly does not destroy, but rather increases our sense of wonder at and reverence for life" we have expressed the idea that the knowledge of the truth increases our awareness of life's wonder or meaning.

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Thursday, December 26, 1940

The values to which self, humanity and God give rise are respectively reason, democracy and faith.

* * *

Friday, December 27, 1940

I was away on a lecture tour the greater part of last week. I left Monday afternoon for Chicago, to get there in time for a Reconstructionist conference which Dr. Honor had arranged the week before. The conference took place at the Covenant Club and lasted from 2:30 to 5:30. Present were besides Honor and myself Rabbi Green (of Aurora), Berman, Nadich, Arnoff and Graubard. Solomon Goldman was out of town. Felix Levy had a speaking engagement and Weinstein who had promised to come failed to show up. Sidney Jacobs, the editor of the Advocate was also present. The greater part of the discussion was devoted to the question of the relation of the Reconstructionist movement to the existing parties in Jewish life. To avoid the danger of becoming an additional party parallel to those which are already in existence I urged that Reconstructionism be presented as the expression of a school of

thought which has a contribution to make to the existing parties. I pleaded with the men that they select from their congregations small groups of men and women whom they should train to think along Reconstructionist lines and live their lives in keeping with the Reconstructionist philosophy. This group should be definitely informed that what they are being given is Reconstructionism. The name is important. They can then act as a ferment in their respective Jewish organizations to influence those organizations to conduct their activities in an affirmative Jewish spirit.

In the evening I spoke at Arnoff's synagogue. My subject was "A Pattern for Modern Jewish Living." I managed to hold the attention of the people and the written questions surprised me by their number and by the intelligence they showed.

Next morning I left for Minneapolis. I was scheduled to speak at Rabbi Albert Gordon's synagogue on "The Jewish Religion for Tomorrow. There was too much wooden pulpit between me and the audience to permit me to get into close touch with them, and I was haunted by the feeling that I was not in rapport with the people. The questions were fewer in number than those I got at Chicago, but they enabled me at least to speak in more concrete terms and to arouse a good bit of interest on the part of the audience.

Rabbi and Mrs. Gordon had not only invited me together with a number of people to dinner before the address but they also had us at their house after the address. Dr. Barron who is a member of the faculty at the University of Minnesota was there with his wife, a Mr. Brin and his wife and a few others. I first met Dr. Barron when I spoke about 25 years ago before the Menorah Group at the University of Minnesota, which was led by Louis I. Newman who has since become one of the leading rabbis in this city.

In the discussion which took place at Rabbi Gordon's home Dr. Barron gave as his conception of God the well known Deistic one based upon the assumption of an initial cause or creator. My reply to that was that what I was mainly interested in was that we associate with the term God with some identifiable and significant experience. If he as a scientist finds the notion of first cause significant he meets that requirement. For most people, however, some more intimate experience is necessary as content of the term God. I found such experience in the will to salvation.

I stopped at Hotel Nicolle.

On Thursday I met a group of people from Al Gordon's congregation and two or three from Rabbi Aaronson's at a luncheon, for the purpose of telling them about the Seminary which is preparing the ground there for a membership campaign.

In the evening I had supper at Rabbi Aronson's. I like him personally but he is too much of a Talmudist to be free from sophistry. According to him Reconstructionism is nothing but conservative Judaism. He goes even further in that respect than Robert Gordis.

On Friday afternoon I met with the Hebrew teachers of Minneapolis and St. Paul and gave them at Dr. Gordon's (the physician who is the principal of the Minneapolis T. T.) invitation a talk on the idea of God. The talk which lasted about an hour and 10 minutes and the discussion which followed were in Hebrew. I was perfectly at ease and thoroughly enjoyed the experience.

Rabbi Herman Cohen of St. Paul sent his son to take me to St. Paul for the Sabbath. I put up at Hotel Commodore there. In the evening I spoke at Rabbi Cohen's synagogue. The attendance was about 400 and I was in good form. My subject was "A Pattern for Modern Jewish Living." After the lecture a large part of the congregation gathered in the assembly room down stairs and I was subjected to a series of

Saturday night, January 4, 1941

I am still groping after some pattern into which all my ideas concerning salvation might arrange themselves. Accordingly many of the preceding entries on that subject are bound to turn out incorrect, especially those which have to do with the main question: what shall constitute for us salvation?

To the extent that there is unity in the life of individuals and societies that unity is both the cause and the effect of men's striving to make the most out of their lives, to achieve the greatest plenitude of which life is capable or in brief, salvation. Until modern times the historical religions have sought to articulate the nature of salvation and the means to it. The modern man finds the traditional conceptions of salvation untenable, because they assume that man is unable to achieve it, under natural conditions of either the physical world or of human life. The modern man assumes that it ought to be possible to achieve salvation with the materials of the environment and of human nature as they are. So far, however, there has not emerged any tenable scheme of mundane salvation. It should be the purpose of soterics to formulate such a scheme.

A scheme of mundane salvation would therefore be one which would set forth a definite goal for human striving. That goal would be one to which we could give ourselves wholeheartedly. Insofar as we have faith in it and live by that faith, we make the most of our lives and do not live in vain. This means that we attain salvation to the extent possible to us under the circumstances and abilities which are ours. This would constitute for each of us intelligent living. What more should we expect from life?

The principles underlying this scheme are: 1) as human beings we live in three dimensions or realms, viz: the realm of content values, the realm of formal values, the realm of the spiritual or final values;

2) Mundane salvation implies the maximum fulfillment of the three types of values simultaneously and harmoniously; 3) while chronologically and in the actual process of achieving mundane salvation the content values come first, the conscious striving after such salvation requires the functioning of the final and formal values from the very beginning as regulative of the content values.

The exposition of a scheme of mundane salvation would accordingly have to proceed along the following lines:

I. The nature of the final values; II. The nature of the formal values; and III. The nature of the content values.

* * *

Monday, January 6, 1941

The content values are the values that inhere in the conditions of human life from the standpoint of a) physical health and security that come from the fulfillment of biological needs; b) social health and security that come only with the control of the means of production now for the first time really possible, and c) mental health security that arises from a confirmed habit of reorganizing truths wherever found.

* * *

Thursday, January 9, 1941

The main problem of soterics: How shall self, society and cosmos be conceived so as to yield symbols necessary to bring about the state of maximum security and self-fulfillment? On the assumption that salvation (security and plenitude of life) requires full realization of life in the three dimensions of content, formal and final values, the conception of the final values must take into account the adequate fulfillment of the content and formal values.

It is impossible to achieve salvation so long as society is conceived as so constituted that violence must ultimately be resorted to as a means of settling the clashing demands of classes and nations.

It is impossible to achieve salvation so long as the self is conceived as so constituted that no amount of conditioning can render it capable of unselfishness.

It is impossible to achieve salvation so long as the cosmos is conceived as so constituted that life and mind are only temporary accidents in a senseless and chance concurrence of protous selection.

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Friday, January 10, 1941

The psycho analysts tell us that the yearning for salvation (security and growth) is merely the yearning for the "reinstatement of that happy time in infancy when one was the center of the world which bent every effort to indulge one's whims." It is "the yearning for maternal care and deeper still, for the quietness of the womb which is gratified by endowing the future with joy without effort, with creativeness without routine." All this may be perfectly true, but the fact is that if the infant were not treated as though it were for the time being the center of the world it would not survive. The mother love, therefore, which thus treats the child is a manifestation of the Power that makes for life. By the same token that Power begets in the adult the yearning for the same kind of love. Out of that yearning arises the yearning for salvation, whence the stimulus to make the most of one's life and of the lives of others.

Or let us take some of the other explanations by which psychoanalysts seemingly invalidate the significance of soteric values. They describe any soteric ideal as "the reading of private preferences into universal history, the elevating of personal aspirations into cosmic necessities, the remolding of the universe in the pattern of desire, the completion of the crippled self by the incorporation of the symbol of the whole."

Friday, January 17, 1941

This week I lectured at Youngstown, Ohio and Rochester, N.Y. I gave my lecture at Youngstown under the auspices of the Jewish Communal Center. When I got to Youngstown on Tuesday at 11:40 I was met at the train by Berlatsky who is in charge of Center programs. Whenever the Center has an out of town speaker it has to make use of the auditorium of either the Reform Synagogue (Rodeph Sholom of which Philio is the rabbi) or of the conservative synagogue (Anshe Emet of which Nathan Kollin is the rabbi). There is a third synagogue, an orthodox one, which strangely enough is also known as a temple.

Berlatsky went with me to the Ohio Hotel where I put up for the one day. I had him give me a general idea of the size and nature of the Jewish population in Youngstown. He told me there were about 7500 Jews of whom about 2500 were affiliated with the synagogue. The number of children that were receiving a Jewish education was very limited. Only the conservative congregation had a week day school for about 150 children. Its president, Mr. Nadler, was insistent upon having the congregation take over whatever educational work was to be done in the community. He regarded any attempt on the part of the community to provide religious education to Jewish children as depriving his congregation of the chance to make members. According to him the only bait a congregation could hold out was the religious school. This competitive attitude on the part of the congregations toward any communal endeavors of a cultural or religious character is quite inbred in most of the key people in Youngstown Jerry.

When it was time for lunch Berlatsky took me to a Jewish restaurant. Originally that restaurant was known as Commercial Club was a Jewish club. When the depression came it was taken over by an individual who runs it for profit. At Christmas time it is decorated with holly and a Christmas tree, but never is there a sign of the Hanukkah festival when that comes round.

After lunch I was asked to present at a conference of a committee of some of the key people of the community who were discussing what to do with the situation presented by the new law to have religion taught in the school. They asked me for my opinion and I told them that the dog in the manger policy we Jews were pursuing was not doing us any good. The effect on the Jewish children who will have to take the regular school studies while their gentile friends will be getting religious instruction in another part of the school will be demoralizing. It is therefore important that the Jewish community representing all elements should make provision for the Jewish children. Those present told me that any communal effort for that purpose would be strongly opposed by Rabbi Philo, who, it seems, is still repeating in polparrot fashion the doctrine on which the Reformists placed all their hopes, viz: the separation of state and church. He had even told the members of his confirmation class they should refuse to take any Jewish religious instruction in case it is given in the public school.

At that conference and during the rest of my stay I renewed my acquaintance with Greenberg, whom I had met years ago in Kansas City and who now was working in Youngstown in the capacity of executive director of the local federation. He seems to be a very sensible and quite capable fellow. He has been following the Reconstructionist and is in sympathy with its purpose. I urged him to collaborate with Nathan Kollin in getting Reconstructionism known among the more influential people.

As for Nathan Kollin he is a nice chap and has a nice young wife and baby. He has served the community for the last six years but would like to change for some pulpit in a university town. He is quite a student but not much of a thinker and somewhat naive.

Despite the small attendance I managed to speak quite well on the subject of American Jewry of Tomorrow. I had recast what I gave at the previous lectures.

From Youngstown I went to Rochester where I had been scheduled to lecture on Wednesday night. At the Rochester station I was met by Judah Pilch who is in charge of the Jewish Young Men's Association and a Mr. Goldstein, the president of the association. A little later they were joined by Rabbi Fisher. I had supper with Pilch, Fisher, Harris, Israel Schoenberg.

The communal situation in Rochester is somewhat unique. Out of about a Jewish population of about 22,000 more than half are affiliated with the synagogue in one way or another. Solomon Goldman told Pilch when the latter left Chicago to go to Rochester that he was going to a city of "frumakes." The reason for their unique conservative tendency of that town is that about 1865 a group of intensely pious Jews laid the foundation of communal life there. Even their grandchildren today are strictly observant, although their knowledge of Judaism is limited to siddur "davening."

I gave the same talk as at Youngstown and proffered to Pilch and Fisher the same kind of advice about cooperating as I had offered to Greenberg and Kollin.

Last night Dr. Isidore Rubin held a second meeting to gain supporters for the Reconstructionist movement. This time the meeting was very poorly attended. There were only three new people present and the amount pledged was \$300 for each of the next four years.

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Saturday, January 18, 1941

Campaigns for funds for various causes are perhaps the most potent media for communicating proper values. Unfortunately our misleaders use these very media to communicate their own perverted sense of values. In the United Jewish Appeal to the JDC people saw to it that alongside the relief for refugees the upbuilding of Palestine should be under-

played for fear that the contributors might become too interested in Zionism. Or take the case of the Seminary. Whenever Finkelstein appeals for support he stresses the following four aims: 1. the training of rabbis; 2. the Library and museum; 3. the interfaith work; 4. the conference on science, philosophy and religion. The nature of his appeal is such as to imply that the order in which he mentions them is the order of importance, the first being the least and the last the most important.

One of the men to be graduated this year from the Seminary is Kolatch. Yesterday he came to see me about the sermon he has to prepare for class. The text which he chose happened to be one that, if properly interpreted, called for a discussion of some phase of the idea of God. When I told him that he said he had been trying to avoid dealing with the idea of God. In reply to my question why he was averse to preaching on the idea of God he said he knew very little about it. I could not even get him to realize the abnormality of such a state of affairs.

Here's another lost soul. Chaim Tchernowitz. Last Sunday there was a big celebration in honor of his 70th birthday. I hadn't been too anxious to attend it because of my inability to be at ease at that kind of an affair, especially as I would have had to deliver an address or make a speech. Fortunately I had a good cause for staying away because the SAJ had the second of this year's informal gatherings that same evening. I sent in a letter, however, to Dr. Bernstein, the chairman of the dinner committee, in which I said some nice things about Tchernowitz. And here (enclosed) is the letter I received from him this morning.

Why really have I not gotten together with him? Basically because we really could not work together. He lacks the modern sociological

approach to the realities of Jewish life, the historical approach to the Jewish traditions and the reconstructive approach to the Jewish future. It is too bad that that is the case, because he possesses both the personality and the pen to get accross anything intrinsically worthwhile.

In interpreting Reconstructionism to newcomers I point out that the Reconstructionist group is aiming to function as a school of thought vis a vis the rabbinical colleges which are schools of learning. As schools of learning their emphasis is upon the past of the Jewish people. They are rendering an indispensable service insofar as they help to make that past objectively real. But they do not concern themselves with the Jewish future. There is therefore need for a school that would concern itself with planning and programing the future.

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Friday, January 24, 1941

The even tenor of my life was interrupted this week by having to officiate at two weddings and one funeral. The funeral was that of Johel M. Wachman, a trustee of the SAJ. His last thirteen years were darkened by the intermarriage of his two daughters with gentiles (cf. Journal of 1927). Despite my attempts then to accept his sons-in-law since they became Jews, he remained obdurate. While such obduracy may seem illiberal, it has been the strongest factor, probably, in keeping the Jewish people alive.

Jacob Klein, also an SAJ member, was a friend of Wachman's and as his lawyer he drew up the will for him. Klein informed me that Wachman left only \$500 for each of the two intermarried daughters and the rest of the estate, which amounts to about \$100,000 to the oldest daughter, May. I tried to get Klein to persuade May not to take advantage of her rightful claim to the bulk of the estate and to give her two sisters a

reasonable large share of it. She is not in good circumstances, and depends upon the income of what her father left her. I doubt therefore whether anything will come of my efforts to bring about a more equitable distribution of the inheritance.

In his will Wachman stated that he did not want any eulogies at his funeral. I was then spared the difficult task of eulogizing. Although in his case there was very much to be said in praise of him, I still would have had to undergo quite a strain in formulating what I would have wanted to say. On the other hand, I was not altogether happy that I was prevented from expressing my own sense of loss, and, above all, from pointing out to those who participated in the funeral the traits of character^{and} of Jewish loyalty that deserved to be admired. Of course, when I consider the futility of all endeavors to raise the standard of human life in general and Jewish life in particular by means of exhortation I feel that what ever momentary effect any words might have, it would be wiped out by the first news item the people would read in the newspaper. But then again if that is the case what value is there to all my thinking and writing and preaching?

^{Two}
~~The~~ weddings took place on Jan. 20 and 21 respectively. The first was Joe Levy's daughter. The second was Alex Rubin's. The amount^t of time and energy I spent on the short wedding talk is incredible. At least at the first wedding I managed to say my little piece without any hitch, except a momentary one that was not noticed. But at the second wedding I almost went to pieces toward the end of my little speech. I simply cannot account for my fear to trust myself to speaking extemporaneously on those occasions. Perhaps it is the feeling that one must rise to a high emotional and poetic pitch and bring out some clear thought all within the five or seven minutes that people are willing to endure is what makes me so fearful to trust myself to the inspiration of the moment. Anyhow officiating at weddings, which I do

so rarely, perhaps because I do it so rarely, is next to officiating at funerals the bane of my existence.

Roughly speaking, the four categories of values on which I have by this time come to base soterics correspond to the four aspects of human life: 1) the body; 2) the environment; 3) the mind; and 4) the spirit.

Tonight is one of those typical wintry nights. A blustering cold north wind with driving snow and sleet has made walking difficult because of snow covered and slippery sidewalks. As I was going to services I noticed a lame man ahead of me trying hard to hobble along and to keep from falling. I hastened my steps and catching up to him I took hold of his arm to prevent him from slipping on the ice. As I did this he said "Thank you, I have developed a way of falling; I fall on my hands."

Apparently this is the only way either the individual, the race or humanity will manage to survive in this stormy world. Crippled as mankind is morally and physically, the only way it has existed has been by developing a way of falling without breaking its neck. That's about all that its spiritual development has amounted to. What mankind really needs is being cured of its lameness and learning to walk straight without having to depend on skillfull falling.

* * *

Monday, February 3, 1941

Last week I went to Cleveland to give three lectures at the Euclid Ave. Temple where Barnett R. Brickner is the rabbi. One lecture I gave on Tuesday morning before the Institute on Judaism for Christian ministers, and the other two I gave on Tuesday evening and Wednesday evening before a lay group consisting of members of the congregation. All the three lectures were given at the small chapel which holds

comfortably about two hundred people. The chapel was filled each time I spoke there. The subject of my first lecture was "Traditional Judaism and Its Reinterpretation." The subject of my second lecture was "A Pattern for Modern Jewish Living" and of my third lecture "The Jewish Religion of Tomorrow." I spoke each time between an hour and a quarter. After the first lecture there were oral questions and after the other two written questions. For once I feel I did a good job. I personally liked my first talk best. I spoke with considerable ease and fluency both in the lecture and in the answers to the questions. There were two questions which I had been sure would be put to me and I planned beforehand what to say in answer to them. They were "What do you think of Einstein's statement made at the recent conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion?" and "If the Christians would give up the dogmas associated with Christ, would the Jews accept him as a prophet or eminently inspired man?"

On Wednesday Brickner had a few of his Temple people meet me at luncheon at a downtown Hotel. At my suggestion he utilized that occasion to tell them about the existence of Reconstructionism and to mention the fact that he owed his approach to the various problems and he dealt with the spirit of the improvements he had introduced into the Temple activities almost entirely to Reconstructionism, and he made a plea for interest in it. I followed him with an explanation of our purpose to function as a school of thought in Jewish life with a view to giving it direction and program. The twenty-five people present seemed to respond quite warmly to the presentation.

I was the guest of the Brickners during my stay in Cleveland. I spoke with him and his wife Rivka for hours and about the status of the inner life of our people. The following are some of the facts I learned about his congregation. Before he came to Cleveland 15 years ago his congregation was headed by Wolsey. The congregation of which

Silver is the rabbi had been headed, before Silver's coming, by Gries. When Silver replaced Gries, there was an exodus from Euclid Ave. Temple (now Brickner's) to Silver's Temple. When Wolsey left and was followed by Brickner, there was a return to Euclid Ave. Temple on the part of those who had left it. There are now 1400 families affiliated with that Temple which, incidentally, is in its 94th year. Many of these families were formerly members of the Jewish Center of Which Sol. Goldman was rabbi when he was in Cleveland. (From this one can see how little stability there is to the congregation and how superficial is its influence upon the life of its members.) The Temple is without a mortgage and has an annual budget of \$76,000. The dues range from \$60 per family to \$200. When I felicitated Brickner on the fact that his congregation was free from the burden of a mortgage, he replied that a mortgage is a good thing for a congregation. It gives the members something specific to work for.

From my discussions with him I gathered that the two important problems which deserve intensive study are: 1) can the congregation become the coordinating agency in Jewish life and can it go into neighborhoods which lack synagogue facilities and organize the people into congregations? and 2) In view of the waning interest in worship as the principal function of congregational affiliation, is it feasible to have its place taken on Friday night and Sunday mornings by other forms of collective activity such as Oneg Shabbat and various educational projects carried out in a spirit of religion?

* * *

Thursday, February 27, 1941

If it weren't for the fact that discontinuing this journal, or the failure to record what I have done these last two weeks would aggravate my present state of mental malaise, I wouldn't waste time writing up these things. Although my physical condition is good, and my financial

condition secure, I am far from happy. The reasons for my feeling that way are three: 1) the meance of evil (p. 40)
2) the inherent desire of most Jews to escape Jewish life, and 3) my own shortcomings -- intellectual and spiritual.

* * *

Wednesday, February 3, 1941

I visited with my niece and nephew (by marriage) Joyce and Murray Rosenberg. After considerable pressure brought on him by Isidore and Milton Rubin, Rosenberg contributed \$500 toward the Reconstructionist fund. So I had to express my appreciation.

From what they tell me, Rosenberg is just shovelling money and is a very rich man. But he is like the average middle class Jew, not only ignorant of what is agitating mankind but is not in the least interested in mankind. His main interest is in making money and in the cows on his "gentleman's farm." Joyce is merely his feminine analogue -- glamorous and self-centered except for her husband and children. What can people like that want with Reconstructionism? The entire evening we were there/^{we}weren't even offered a drink of water.

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Sunday, February 9, 1941

The staff of the Jewish Education Committee gave their chiefs, Dushkin and Chipkin, a testimonial dinner on the occasion of their having concluded thirty years in the service of Jewish education. With the dark prospect for Jewish life as a whole and Jewish education in particular, I found it very hard to put together a few thoughts that would be appropriate for the occasion. I spent several hours preparing for the ten minute talk I had been asked to give. But at least I had no reason for feeling depressed afterwards as is generally the case these days after I am through speaking, either because the talk is labored or the effect of it is nil.

Monday, February 10, 1941

The Reconstructionist Foundation Board met to act on my suggestion that Mrs. Jacob Grossman be appointed executive secretary. Something had to be done to get things moving.

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Sunday, February 16, 1941

I addressed the Hillel Group of Rutgers College. I spoke to about 100 undergraduates. Rabbi Keller, a graduate of the JIR has charge of the Hillel work. The address was part of a forum which he conducts at his Temple. I spoke glibly, but the entire atmosphere was depressing.

* * *

Tuesday, February 18, 1941

Mrs. Lindheim is a voice crying in the wilderness. She would like to reconstruct the economic foundation of American-Jewish life by introducing the Halutz movement into this country. She believes that if Jewish youth can be directed in the organization of agricultural collectives animated by the ideal of conserving and developing Jewish life there would be a veritable Jewish renaissance in America. She came to urge me to call a conference of Jewish youth and other organizations for the purpose of discussing the plan and taking steps to put it into effect. I promised to do what I can.

In the evening of that day the third campaign meeting for the Reconstructionist foundation took place. This one was sponsored by Milton Rubin. The meeting was saved from being a failure by Rabbi Sandrow who had brought with him five of his stalwarts. Having gotten them to come with the understanding that they would not be solicited for funds, they could not be expected to contribute, but they said that if I consented to come out to Cedarhurst and to address a meeting which they would arrange for me they would raise some funds. I accepted this invitation ~~which they~~ and will speak at Cedarhurst on March 5.

Wednesday, February 19, 1941

Boaz Cohen, chairman of the Law Committee of the Rabbinical Assembly arranged a special conference on Jewish law for that day. It began with a luncheon and concluded with a dinner and addresses following the dinner. At the luncheon there were about 70 graduates and by the time Prof. Ginzberg gave his address there were about 100. Apparently the men were really eager to get some constructive message pertaining to making Jewish law compatible with life. Both Boaz Cohen and Louis Epstein who spoke during the first part of the conference indicated by what they had to say that they were not altogether impervious to the realities of contemporary life. But Ginzberg was simply impossible. For over one and a half hours he dilated upon two points of ancient interpretation of the law. The substance of what he said could have been given in 15 minutes, or at the ~~utmost~~ utmost 1/2 hour. The subject was announced a "Interpretation vs. Abrogation." That suggested that he would deal with the problem of Jewish law as it affects us today. Instead of which what he said was simply a rehash of two or three of the lectures he gives in class, interspersed with sarcastic remarks about everybody who presumes to express an opinion based on less knowledge of Jewish law than he himself had, and with deliberately concocted mannerisms to impress the heavens with his own greatness. Following the example of some of the Talmudic sages who would begin with (p. 42) his first words are "I'll tell you a story." There is a ha-ha and he pulls out one of his old chestnuts. Then he tells the men how glad he is to have them back in class. Then there is a series of statements, in themselves not uninteresting, but given with an air of being copernician in their revolutionary character., when all they amount to is commonplace ~~and~~ sociological truths. After he has spoken for an hour and has had four sips of water which has been handed to him by Boaz Cohen, he pulls out a piece of paper

and makes the remark "I forgot to look at my notes." The men laugh and that pleases his vanity. He fumbles with the piece of paper, and puts it back into his inside pocket and the men laugh again. What's funny about all this is that I saw him go through exactly these same motions about four years ago when he gave a similar kind of lecture to the graduates.

Having thought that Ginzberg would really speak to the subject for which he had been announced, I was under the impression that he would attack the position I maintained with regard to ritual observance -- that such observance does not come properly within the category of law -- I prepared a statement in which I dealt with the relation of law to sanctions. Instead of entering into a discussion of ritual observances as such, I tried to prove that so long as there was no Jewish society that could apply sanctions it was meaningless to speak of Jewish law. I did not expect Ginzberg to do me the courtesy of taking me seriously, but I felt I must get this idea off my chest, and that I must make him realize that I am ready to beard him in his den. I spoke only about 15 minutes, but I had carefully prepared notes and managed to make my point quite effectively.

After dinner Drs. Tchernovitz and Greenstone spoke. The attendance was very poor and what both of these men had to say bore chiefly on Epstein's suggested solution of the Agunah problem. Tchernowitz was by far the more sensible of the two. Greenstone was a model of timidity.

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Saturday, February 22, 1941

It was my turn to speak at the SAJ services. My subject was "What the Law is For." I tried to say too much at one time and the result was a poor sermon with the usual aftermath of self-disgust. It is already Thursday and despite considerable activity since I haven't altogether gotten over the demoralizing effect on me of that sermon.

At the end of the services we dedicated the American and the Zionist flags which had been presented to the synagogue by the Judsons. (Even on an occasion like this and with no excuse for staying away, since it was Washington's birthday, Mr. Judson didn't come to services.) I am not so sure that in my earlier years I would have altogether approved of the idea of having flags in the synagogue, but I am getting tired of making an issue of such trifles when we are so beset by dangers that threaten the entire structure of life and civilization.

* * *

Monday, February 25, 1941

I spoke that night at Worcester before Israel Chodosh's congregation. I was pleasantly surprised at the large attendance he had managed to secure for me and I was in quite good spirits. The result was that the audience, I and everybody concerned were happy. "Abbi Isaac Klein of Springfield (a seminary graduate and quite a Talmudist) met me on the train as it pulled into Springfield and offered to drive me in his car to Worcester. I accepted the invitation and on the way we had a very interesting conversation. I asked him frankly how, with his strict orthodoxy he could display such an interest in my unorthodox approach to Judaism. He replied that his orthodoxy extended only to his conduct but not to his thinking.

Last week I wrote up a statement on the action of the Council of Federations and Welfare Funds at Atlanta which voted to have a referendum on the question: Should the Council appoint a budgeting committee advising to the local federations specific allocations of the funds they collect? The matter has been discussed at meetings of the Reconstructionist Editorial Board. I was therefore in a position to accede to the request made to me by a Mr. Israeli who works for the UPA that I forestall a favorable vote on that referendum by pointing to its undemo-

cratic implications. To me it had very definite assimilationist implications, and I made that fact quite plain. Abba Hillel Silver, chairman sent me a telegram thanking me for my letter and praising it highly.

This week Fishman, a member of the Welfare Board staff, whose task is to foster community organization, came to see me before yesterday and asked me to send a letter to Gus Kaplan, president of the Harrisburg on the occasion of the conference on Community Organization which will take place next Sunday, expressing my satisfaction with the work they were doing. I formulated a strong statement on community as the sine qua non of American Jewish life.

What is Finky up to again? The students at the Seminary on the History of Religion tell me that Prof. Paul Weiss, who teaches religion at Bryn Mawr, has been giving a series of lectures as part of Finkelstein's seminar, and that Weiss has taken occasion to attack my approach to Jewish religion as being pragmatic. Finkelstein was going to have Mortimer Adler lecture this term, but somehow Adler couldn't make it. It looks as though Finky is now bringing in these mento combat my influence in the same way as Charles Hoffman fought to get Finky to teach theology to counteract the heresies I was spreading among the students.

* * *

Friday, February 28, 1941

There are four possible approaches to the study of reality: the scientific, the ontological, the epistemological and the soteric. The scientific approach is interested strictly speaking in the uniformities of succession and precedence among phenomena. In popular parlance this interest is identified with ascertaining the relation of cause and effect, espeically in terms of quantitative correlation and with the

dissipation of delusions concerning the causes of phenomena. The ontological approach abstracts from phenomena all qualities and modes and attempts to discover the nature of the reality underlying them. Before long it is discovered that no satisfactory study of being is possible without first making a study of the process of knowing, i.e. without epistemology. This is not a study of knowledge as a psychological phenomena. Such a study is science. It is a study of the very instruments of thought by which we come to recognize knowing as a psychological phenomenon. In contrast with all the three foregoing approaches is the soteric. This approach is interested in reality or any phase of it specifically from the standpoint of what it means for human salvation. The soteric approach includes religion, ethics and politics. There are thinkers who believe that just as science and ontology (or metaphysics) are in need of a propaedeutic -- epistemology, so soterics is in need of a propaedeutic -- exiology or the study of values.

In the pre-modern and unphilosophic thinking all the four approaches were treated as one. The problem of distinguishing them from one another is one that must engage anyone who wants to save religion from the wreck of antiquated science and fantastic metaphysics. This is what I am trying to do with the conception of God, which for the ancients was an answer not only to questions in soterics but also in science, metaphysics and epistemology. My contention is that from the soteric standpoint the conception of God is the Power that makes for salvation. As such the God idea is a correlative term and can have no meaning apart from our actual strivings to make the most out of life. The idea of God is like the idea of father. Fatherhood cannot be contemplated apart from its relationship to a child. As such it denotes generation, cate, etc. The question whether the father is rich or poor has nothing to do with fatherhood as such, although it undoubtedly affects the way in which the fatherhood functions. Likewise godhood as such has

reference only to salvation. The question of one or many affects the question of salvation since one god means one kind of salvation and many gods means many or conflicting kinds of salvation. But whether God is corporeal or incorporeal, the creator of the world or coeternal with the world while interesting questions in themselves, are questions which have nothing to do with godhood as such. They have to do with being, in the abstract.

* * *

Sunday, March 2, 1941

A number of ideas have been knocking about in my mind lately which deserve recording. One is with regard to the taunt to which I am often subjected, namely, that my main interest is in the idea of God but not in his reality. Milton Steinberg repeats this charge in the current number of the Reconstructionist. In reply I might point to the fact that in the Bible and in the liturgy the name of God is used interchangeably with the term God (p. 45).
etc.

Maurice Samuel's explanation of antisemitism is only partly correct. According to him the goyim take out on the Jews their hatred of Christianity. That is true. But what is not true is his contention that they hate Christianity because it represents a conception of life to which they are inherently opposed. In my opinion they hate Christianity because it was forced on them at the expense of their own normal development of the religious phases of their respective cultures. Christianity demands of them the renunciation of their own ancestry and their own past and the adoption of the past of an obscure oriental little people and its ancestry. It may not be surprising that this very attempt tour de force practiced on the western nations has helped to bring out the worst in them.

Another very important factor for antisemitism is, on the one hand, the indomitable will to live as a people, which the Jews have manifested to an extraordinary degree, and on the other, their exposing themselves, as a consequence of that will to live as a people to the risk of becoming the scapegoat for all the failures and frustrations which fall to the lot of the majority population among whom they live.

The difficulty of dealing with nationhood from an ethical standpoint is due to its ambivalent character. It is in this respect entirely like the ego of the individual, a potential force both for good and for evil. Historically it has been a factor for liberation, though nowadays it is quite definitely a force for enslavement.

Yesterday Ira's sermon dealt with the controversy between Milton Steinberg and Eugene Kohn in the current number of the Reconstructionist. At the Sabbath Seudah in the afternoon, when it is usual to discuss the sermon of the morning, Mrs. Sarah Epstein (she's now about 75) remarked that the trouble with the two articles by Steinberg and Kohn is that they are unintelligible. She saw no reason, she said, why they couldn't write as plainly as Ira could speak. She understood Ira but she couldn't understand the articles despite her having read them before and after the services. While^{she}/is by no means to be taken too seriously, yet she is not the only one who balks at anything in the magazine that doesn't read like the conventional article about antisemitism and Jewish self-respect -- which seems to be the limit of the average Jew's understanding of or interest in anything Jewish. I thought that the discussion might bring forth some concrete suggestion as to what can be done to enlarge the range of understanding and interest. I therefore proposed that those who speak should address themselves to the question: What can or should be done to render the writing and preaching on the idea of God sufficiently popular?

As soon as I was through, Semel asked for the floor. He made the point that the idea of God does not lend itself to discussion or popularization and should therefore be let alone. He maintained that each one who prayed had his own idea of God and that we should let it go at that. To show how futile it was for me e.g. to attempt to give the people my conception of God, he repeated the story he had heard from Einstein. When all the papers were full of the news about his discovery of relativity his son, who was then about 17 or 18, wanted his father to tell him what relativity was. Einstein took a long walk with him and dilated on the subject at great length. When he was all through his son turned to him and said "Papa, I think it's all fake." (ein Schwindel). Likewise, said Semel, how could I expect the people who lack the ~~intelligent~~ intellectual background to grasp an idea to which I had given years of preparation and study.

Another interesting story which he told is, on the face of it, a devastating argument against all attempts to probe deeply into the meaning of God, life, humanity, etc. A young man was walking hastily on a bridge. The man who followed him noticed that the young man was about to climb over the fence apparently to jump into the river. The older person ran up to him and said to him "Young man, I see you want to commit suicide. Before you do so let me have a talk with you. The young man paused for a moment and yielded to his suggestion. They sat down on a bench nearby and they talked for a long time. The end was that they both jumped into the river. M_oral (p. 47)

There is undoubtedly a great deal of truth to the contention that the more we think about the basic problems of life the more hopelessly confused we are. But unfortunately the alternative of not thinking at all is bound to lead to something worse than confusion, i.e. either to stupidity or to disaster or to both. It might be possible to formulate some criterion that would help one decide how

far to go in one's thinking and when to stop. That perhaps is one of the main advantages of making salvation the focal idea in all thinking beyond the domain of the exact sciences. That is to say, as soon as an idea leads us away from the purpose of making the most of life, or from the goal of growth of personality, we should drop it. The assumption underlying this attitude is that the only justification of thinking is that it is a means to life and its enhancement. Thought which makes for the impoverishment or destruction of life is ipso facto wrong. I wonder how far one can go with this rather precarious assumption.

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Tuesday, March 4, 1941

Last night I spoke at Troy. This was the second time I was there. The first time was in Nov. 13, 1934 (See Vol. VIIp. 255 original text). This time I had been invited by Rabbi Geffen to speak in his synagogue before his adult study group. He met me at the station at Albany and drove me to his home in Troy. On the way he told me exactly the same story as he did then. His story as then dwelt upon the way he happened to get the position. Originally he had come to take charge of the Center but before long those who had been dissatisfied with the orthodox synagogue organized the conservative congregation which he now heads. Since then he has gradually developed considerable sentiment in favor of Reconstructionism. My talk was well received.

* * *

March 5, 1941

The work on the new Pesah Haggadah seems to be interminable. After I got the third proof I discovered that the entire section which consists of rabbinic comments on Deut. 26:5-8 was left untranslated and uninterpreted in the English text. This meant cutting out about three pages of Hebrew and upsetting the pagination. I went down yesterday to Behrman's to try to straighten the thing out and worked

late into the night. Ira has been putting in tremendous labor and so has Deenah Behrman into this Haggadah. I hope that there won't be any regrets when it finally appears and that it will appear in time for the coming Pesah.

Despite the numerous times I have repeated my talks on "The Jewish Religion for Tomorrow" and "The Pattern for Modern Jewish Living" and despite the interest they aroused in the audiences I am far from satisfied with my presentation of the case ~~of~~ for Judaism. In any presentation I still assume that Jews are interested in Jewish survival, and seem to forget that they are mainly interested in their personal welfare. I am scheduled to address a group at Cedarhurst for the purpose of interesting them in Reconstructionism. I should like to hew along the following lines:

For the last 150 years an increasing number of Jews have been finding their adherence to the Jewish people more of a liability than an asset.

Until the present wave of anti-semitism such Jews cherished the hope of becoming assimilated and thus being freed from their liability as Jews.

Now that hope is gone. The general effect is to make them even more bitter and to give the average Jew a sense of being trapped.

In the face of this tragic situation the reasonable thing to do is to study ways and means of making adherence to the Jewish people as much of an asset as possible.

To know what will render such adherence an asset, it is necessary to realize what made it an asset in the past. Belonging to the Jewish people and accepting its social heritage did three things for the Jew. 1. It helped him to live; 2. It elicited the best in him, and 3. It made him feel at home in the world. But it is also necessary

to realize that if adherence to the Jewish people and Judaism is to do these things now for the Jew we have to reckon with the changes that have taken place in our ideas of what constitutes living, of what we regard as the best in us and what is needed to make us feel at home in the world.

To carry out such a task we need a new school of thought. Schools of learning are not inclined to assume such a task which involves re-interpretation of aims and reconstruction of means.

What is meant by reinterpretation of aims? The answer will throw light on what is meant by reconstruction of means.

1. As for the aim of helping the Jew to live: In the past the Jew looked to the Jewish people to give him eternal life. As God's chosen people it conferred immortality upon all who belonged to it. Whatever suffering the Jew underwent in this world was migratory compared with the immortal bliss that awaited him in the hereafter.

Nevertheless the Jewish people also helped the Jew in his temporal life. It cared for his physical, social and moral well being. It protected his interests, it gave him literacy, it sought to ward off the attacks against him.

Nowadays the Jew looks to the general community to help him live. The attitude of the general community toward the Jew in this respect is ambivalent. In part it helps him live and in part it renders life difficult for him. If being a Jew is to be once more an asset his people must counteract the difficulties placed in his way by the non-Jewish world.

For those Jews whose life is made unbearable by anti-semitism the Jewish people must rebuild Palestine. For the rest of Jewry, the Jewish people must function through community organization. The task of the community should be a) to give every Jew a sense of belonging; b) to deal with the problem of economic discrimination, etc.

2. As for eliciting the best in the Jew: In the past the Jew regarded the Jewish way of life as of divine origin and therefore as embodying the will of God. He regarded as the best in him compliance with God's will.

Nowadays the best in him is identified with the highest ethical traits. The Jewish way of life must therefore be so reconstructed as to impel the Jew to live up to the highest moral standards of decency and goodness. Being identified with the Jewish people should lead to as much of a sense of noblesse oblige as being identified with the Quaker sect.

(Creative self-expression has come to be regarded as indispensable to the life of the spirit. The Jewish way of life must therefore include the encouragement of Jewish art. Our emotional needs must be satisfied in keeping with the highest standards of artistic beauty and creativity.) This should be transferred to the next section. see p. 51 original text.

3. As for making the Jew feel at home in the world, or rendering human life worthwhile etc.

* * *

Thursday, March 5, 1941

Last night was the first time I ever appealed to a mixed crowd for the support of Reconstructionism. My talk was successful and Rabbi Sandrow set a good example by becoming a donor at \$25 per year for the next four years. I believe that I succeeded in raising about \$1000. It was hard work but quite worth while.

I had a very unexpected visitor today in Willen, the director of the Business Group of Federation, i.e. unexpected in the sense that he should call at all. He came to talk to me about my attitude toward the leaders in Federation and JDC whom I charge as a group with being

assimilationists. He claims that by ~~my~~ my tactics I am introducing strife among our people. There is no question that by making an issue of assimilation I am not contributing to the peace of the community. But the question is: Can the outcome of strife between loyalists and assimilationists make for the strengthening of Judaism? Certainly the assimilationists among whom there are some very worthwhile people will not be converted as a result of agitation against them. On the other hand, I wouldn't mind having some of our loyalists turn assimilationists. In fact, if they became goyim altogether I would be even more pleased, because they do us Jews little credit.

* * *

Saturday night, March 9, 1941

According to Willen I am regarded by those whom I charge with assimilationism as an extreme Jewish nationalist and as favoring ghettoism. In fact they consider me as quite an-American. Of course I poohpoohed this notion they have of me and explained to him my conception of Jewish nationhood and of the place of Palestine from a political standpoint. When he heard what I had to say he replied that if I were to get together with those I denounce, say with a man like Proskauer, both sides would realize that they have much more in common than they suspect. He was especially pleased by my statement that I am willing to cooperate with assimilationists provided they come out openly with their views on what is best for the Jews to do. According to him there has taken place a change of heart on the part of many of the assimilationists. They now realize that the door to assimilationism is shut. He thought that I, on the other hand, had retreated from my former position of intransigent nationalism. This, of course, is not true. I never was an intransigent nationalist.

Shortly after Willen saw me he called me up to ask whether I could have him and Proskauer lunch with me on Saturday, March 15. I told him "gladly."

The two facts about Judaism which have obsessed me of late are 1) to understand Judaism it is necessary to concentrate on the will of the Jewish people to live as an identifiable group, and 2) this will to live as a people functions in the mind of the individual Jew only so long as he believes that the Jewish people helps him live, elicits the best that is in him and enables him to find himself at home in the world. It is this second fact that Ahad Ha-am failed to realize. He regarded the belief in otherworldly reward and punishment as having atomized Jewish solidarity by making it dependent upon the will of the individual Jew. His ideal was to have the individual Jew merge his identity with his people completely as the Jew did in biblical days.

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(cont from typescript p. 81 center)

there are three steps in the achievement of this result: 1) a conception of God based on experience; 2) a system of rites and observances which raise the routine of life to a higher level of significance; and 3) esthetic creativity whereby we articulate our response to life. Such response somehow has the effect of justifying life in a sense that has nothing to do with the conventional theodicies. Creative self-expression (etc.) see last paragraph p. 49 original script) "The poet" says Babette Deutsch (Men. Journal XXIX, 1) "justifies life by the art to which he confides his pain."

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Tuesday, March 18, 1941

Monday, March 10 I lectured in Newark. This was the first of a series of two lectures given as part of a symposium in memory of Aaron Robison who was executive director of the Newark YM & YWHA. The attendance consisted of about 200 people among whom were many of the Jewish lay leaders of Newark and some rabbis. In my talk I followed the new tack of urging that Jewish life be reconstructed with a view

to rendering it an asset instead of liability to the Jew. I did fairly well, although when I saw a transcript of the address I was shocked by the choppiness of the English in it. I was not at all satisfied with the manner in which the question period was conducted by Rosenthal who acted as chairman.

Tuesday March 11 I presented the case of Reconstructionism to a group of about 20 people at Harold Garfunkel's home. I believe that the talk I gave there was the most smooth-spoken I have given in a long time. It was also satisfactory from the standpoint of its effect on those present. The amount raised was not much -- about \$300 annually for a period of four years.

Wednesday, March 12 Mr. Wright representing a movement for democracy known as "New America" which has been active for the years five or six years came to see me. I gather from the literature he had sent me that it is a movement to foster a modest socialism. It advocates nationalization of banks and natural resources. The literature I received consisted of a quarterly, a biweekly and a monthly. I learned from Mr. Wright, who seems to be a field secretary, that the quarterly and monthly, both of which are mimeographed, had a circulation respectively of 800 and 300. I asked him how large a fund he was trying to get and how much was promised toward it. He told me that he tried to raise \$2,000 per annum toward which 11,000 was pledged. It struck me as odd -- and I told him so -- that we of the Reconstructionist group were out to raise \$10,000 per annum and toward that amount a little over \$5000 was pledged and that we too have been on the scene for the last five or six years. Yet I cannot understand that with so basic an appeal and with the whole country to draw on "New America" should be only about twice as widespread as the Reconstructionist.

Saturday night, March 15. The dinner given to Ira in honor of the 10th anniversary of his ministry in the SAJ was a gala affair. Ira as usual was in excellent form. Finkelstein was quite good. In the course of his remarks he stressed the fact that the Seminary is unique in that it permits diversity in interpretation of Judaism. This, of course is not true. The Jewish Institute of Religion was founded specifically on the principle of freedom of teaching and has lived up to that principle, whereas I have often encountered opposition and at times even hostility. But he knew it would please the audience to hear him make such a statement, so he said what he did regardless of what he may have to say elsewhere.

My talk, despite the considerable thought I had given to it, did not prove successful. It may be that I am too conscious of how much is expected of me. That, together with the fact that my memory failes me when it comes to getting the right word just when I need it undoubtedly contributes to the labored character of my remarks. Perhaps back of both factors is my chronic unhappiness about the world in general and Jews and Judaism in particular.

Yet how thankful I ought to be to God! What would I have done without Ira? Either the SAJ or I would have gone to pieces.

Sunday, March 16. I took part in the program of the opening of the Hebrew Week which took place at the 23 St. building of CCNY. I had worked quite hard on the address I was to deliver but I am not sorry I did so because it worked out quite well and it gave me occasion to get a whack at the isolationist Hebraists whom I detest only second to the assimilationists. I believe the address will appear in the forthcoming issue of the Hadoar.

Monday, March 17, 1941

Last night I gave my second lecture at Newark. I was annoyed at the much diminished audience although the extremely cold weather may have had something to do with it. Moreover, the old man, Rabbi Charles Isaiah Hoffman, was in the audience. I was sure he had come to heckle me because he has been very unfriendly to me these last 15 years, and the only purpose he could have in coming to listen to me was to attack me after I would be through. My talk was very labored despite the fact that I had given most of it before and that I had enough of novelty in it to freshen it up. Hoffman jumped up as soon as Rosenthal, the chairman, asked for questions from the floor, and read a long question which he had written out. He asked how anything based on a denial of revelation could be other than an abrogation? I somehow managed to answer the question. In answering the second question put by an orthodox heckler I stated frankly that a person who had to choose between staying away from services on Sabbath and riding in an automobile should ride and attend the services.

I still haven't gotten over the depressing effect which the talk had on myself.

* * *

Friday, March 21, 1941

Willen, the director of the Federation Business Man's group brought Proskauer to my house for lunch last Saturday. Proskauer is an old man, who has a sense of his own importance and is very cocksure and opinionated. He feels he has a right to be that because he was a Supreme Court judge who went back to the practice of law, in which he seems to be very successful.

As soon as he came to the house he tried to locate me as one of the boys he had in the club he led at the Educational Alliance Building during the late Blaustein's regime. He didn't ~~xyxia~~ strike right this time.

He veered the conversation almost at once to the editorial in the Reconstructionist in which he was attacked for having sent out the appeal letter in which no mention was made of the name Jew. In the course of his remarks he said a number of things which made it possible for one to get back at him. He not only assailed bitterly the Zionist movement, but made it clear that he would refuse to give to United Jewish Appeal because part of the meant would go to Palestine. Everything he said was seconded by Willen. Both of them made the statement that Jews had no right to act as a group through representatives democratically elected whose authority in the use of funds collected was final. Any such collective self-government on the part of Jews, they implied, was un-American, because it meant group segregation. On the other hand, they both maintained that private philanthropy, which of course meant sectarian philanthropy, was in the interest of democracy. This breach in their logic was the opening which I sought out in my reply to them. But they were intransigent throughout.

Proskauer admitted that while he no longer found the synagogue necessary to him personally, he regarded it as an indispensable institution for the maintenance of moral standards. The synagogue and philanthropy provided sufficient functioning for the Jews as a group. Anything beyond that, according to Proskauer, was dangerous and ought to be suppressed. He regards himself as a good Jew. He was therefore keenly hurt by the characterization of him in the Reconstructionist as an assimilationist.

His visit taught me that henceforth I must be careful not to lump together into one category all the assimilationists but to differentiate them into different grades.

Wednesday, March 19 I lectured at Rabbi Leon Lang's center at Germantown. This time I happened to speak effectively and with ease. I felt good for about 12 hours after that.

Today I had again one of those periodic shocks which upset me frightfully. I refer to Finky's taking me over the carpet for interfering with his Seminary campaign by addressing home meetings in behalf of the Reconstructionist Foundation and having Mrs. Grossman contact Seminary graduates for the purpose of holding Reconstructionist meetings. Incidentally he indicated that the Teachers Institute is nothing but a ~~xxx~~ liability incurring a deficit of \$31,000 annually. He learned about those home meetings from a statement which Ira had inserted into the "Realities and Values" in the Reconstructionist.

Of course if I were sure that by resigning from the Seminary I would be more effective in achieving what I am after -- the reconstruction of Jewish life and thought -- I would not hesitate for a moment and I would send in my resignation.

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Saturday, March 22, 1941

I was so wrought up yesterday by Finky's onslaught that on my way from the Seminary all kinds of plans were forming themselves in my mind whereby I could escape from his claws. The first thing I did when I got home was to call up Stephen Wise to arrange for an interview with him. Perhaps, I thought, he might help me out. I knew that the JIR was about to be merged with the Hebrew Union College. Perhaps that very fact might open up some opportunity that would emancipate me from the Seminary. Wise said he could see me today in his office at 4:15.

In the meantime, after talking over with Lena and with some of the children the pros and cons of resignation from the Seminary I decided not to broach to Wise any of the difficulties I was encounter-

ing. Instead, I was to show him the "New Haggadah", an unbound copy of which I had just gotten and to ask him about the merger of the JIR with the Hebrew Union College.

When I met him he surmised that I came to learn about the merger. I spent a few minutes with him -- he is always in such a damn hurry -- showing him the new features of the New Haggadah. I managed to pin his attention down to what I was saying, but I saw that he was impatient and wanted to talk about the merger. And this is what he told me: About two years ago James Heller of Cincinnati suggested that the two institutions get together. He (Wise) could not and still does not understand why they should have been so eager for the amalgamation, except as he put it, they had this passion for uniting institutions and activities which had intrinsically little in common. He calls it "unionists." Union he says is not unity. When I interpolated that it was the passion for monopoly of control he assented. (It seems peculiar that he should not have recognized it for what it is.)

The conditions are that he should take over the administration of the new institution and Morgenstern would be co-President. Some of the faculty of the JIR would be retired, among them Tchernowitz. He thinks that with only three years for him to serve, since he would be seventy at the end of that time, both he and Morgenstern would be retired to make way for a young man.

The one condition on which he insists and which he thinks might stand in the way of the amalgamation is that the present JIR become a New York branch of the new institution. The rabbinical course would consist of five years, two of which would have to be spent by every student in the branch here while the other three in Cincinnati.

The reason for his insistence are: 1) It is absurd that Cincinnati with its 20,000 Jews should retain the same position today as in 1880 when it had about 15% of the Jewish population in the United States,

and that of N.Y. City with the area within a radius of 50 miles which harbors more than two million Jews should leave the rabbinical field entirely to the Seminary. The Seminary was to him the president, With Finkelstein as its president it represented "stoogism for assimilationism" because, as he put it, "Finkelstein was the "theological stooge of the assimilationists."

To prove his point he mentioned one incident in connection with the Pan-American Jewish Congress to be convoked in Montevideo next July. When the American Jewish Committee learned of the plans to have the Congress meet in Montevideo Finky was sent to interview Berle, the undersecretary in the State Department and to impress upon him the need of preventing the Congress from meeting there or anywhere else. The argument F. used was that the Congress was a political body, in contrast with the American Jewish Committee which was spiritual in character. Berle called a meeting to which Wise had been invited to discuss the advisability but actually to point out the inadvisability of having the Congress meet. Wise did not attend, but went to see Berle by himself. He then told him that both Secretary Hull and Welles had been informed of the contemplated meeting the Jewish Congress and that they had given their full approval.

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Monday, March 24, 1941

Last night the Seminary students held their formal dance which they had dedicated to me. This is the first time they did any such thing. Despite my scolding them from time to time for their lackadaisical attitude toward the burning problems of Jewish life, I seem to be rather popular with them because they get from me what they need most for their calling -- a point of view.

It was a very pleasant affair. Finky had to extend to me the greetings of the Faculty. I give him credit for the fact that he didn't say anything about me personally but used the occasion to point out the unity underlying the diversity of views represented by the different members of the Faculty.

I had worked quite hard at the talk I was to give, and I was rewarded by the fact that it was successful. In addition to "kibbztzing" I developed the following idea: On the principle that good and evil are what we make of things (an idea implied in (p.56) the dance may be a dance of death as that of the golden calf or a dance of life as that of God and the righteous in the world to come. ().

Yesterday I found at the Seminary the enclosed memorandum from Finkelstein. This afternoon I had a talk with him in reference to it. The following points were made clear in the course of a 40 minutes' chat in which neither of us had occasion to lose his temper: 1) I was mistaken in thinking ~~xx~~ that Prof. Marx who was present at the interview on Friday had been called in by Finky to be a kind of witness to my discomfiture. According to F. he had called in Marx for a purpose similar to the one for which he had called me -- to help him raise funds for the Seminary. (When I reread the memorandum I discovered that F. lied. He had spoken to Marx before.)

2) That the \$31,000 he talked about could be reduced to \$26,000. He promised to let me have from time to time the treasurer's statement of the expenditures and income of the TI.

3) That the Reconstructionist campaign was to omit from its plans graduates of the Seminary until the Seminary itself is financially on its feet. This does not apply to graduates of other rabbinical institutions.

4) That I go out with F. on a campaign for the Seminary with the understanding that some definite allocation of the funds collected be worked out for the Rabbinic School, the Teachers Institute and the Library.

The "New Haggadah" is off the press. I have been showing the unbound copies which I received from Behrman to Stephen Wise and to the Teachers ~~Semi~~ Institute and Seminary students.

Wise didn't seem to know enough about the traditional Haggadah to appreciate the innovations in the new one. Neither did for that matter most of the students. But while most of them were very favorably impressed, some reacted very violently against it. In the Institute when I showed it to the small class that takes Religion 7-8, Ben-Zion (a son of Rabbi Benjamin, a man of rather unsavory reputation) was almost livid with rage at finding the Makkot and the imprecation (p. 57) excluded. He characterized the New Haggadah as meant for an inter-faith conference to show the goyim what a fine people we are. Such an attitude at this time he said was (p. 57) . This morning when I showed it to the Seminary students Abraham Goldberg, a member of this year's graduating class, was scandalized by the omission of part of the Hallel. He contended that with the Talmud devoting so much space to the discussion of the question of the Hallel such ruthless slashing as we did showed a brutal disregard for the sanctity of tradition.

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Thursday, April 10, 1941

I gave my unit course in Religious Education at Teachers College. It consisted of four two hour periods. I had given one two hour period in December. The four periods were March 25 and 27 and April 1 and 3. Both Miss Case and Miss Forsythe attended all the lectures and they seemed to be very much interested. There were only 17 students in the

class, of whom four were Jewish, three men (two Yeshiva rabbis and 1 TI student) and one woman.

According to what Chipkin tells me, they intended to give up the courses in Religious Education. But the fact that my appointment was renewed for next year shows that they will probably continue for another year.

Prof. Case seems as much troubled about the tenability of her own church (I think she is Episcopalian) as a Jew would be if Judaism were a religion only. She accepts intellectually my identification of religion with civilization, but finds it difficult to reconcile the position of Protestantism with that conception of religion.

The entire edition of the New Haggadah which consisted of 3000 copies was sold out within ten days after it came off the press. Last Sunday there appeared a vicious attack on it by Gedaliah Bublick in the Jewish Morning Journal.

Personally I am satisfied that this gave me an opportunity to bring out into the open the issue of the "Chosen People. "It will be even harder to give up than the doctrine of revelation, although the latter is one of the three cardinal principles of traditional Judaism.

In the defensive campaign against Finky I am trying to be as wary as possible so as not to give him a chance to take me off guard. At the meeting of the TI Faculty this Tuesday I told them of F's machinations to destroy the Institute. At the Executive Committee meeting of the Rabbinical Assembly, the luncheon was devoted to the Seminary campaign. I took advantage of the opportunity to point out the unfairness of appealing for funds not only for the rabbinical dept. but

also for the TI and then treating the expenditures of the TI as entirely a deficit in the Seminary budt. I took care not to implicate F but in a sense blamed the Board of Directors for not treating the rabbis who are asked to provide a considerable part of the funds as partners in the undertaking. I suspect that F is going to use that against me in his attempts to undermine my position with the members of the Board.

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Sunday night, April 13, 1941

Again I received a letter from F. Every time I receive any mail which I recognize as coming from the Seminary I get the jitters. For a few weeks I had lost the sense of insecurity which F. had aroused in me when he put to me the question whether he ought not to suggest to the Board of Directors of the Seminary that the TI be turned over to the Jewish Education Committee. But it was awakened again by his recent machinations. The enclosed letter from him, dated April 10, is as full of contradictions as his own miserable character, and yet he has the gumption to make a bid for more and more power. However diabolical a creature Hitler is, his love of Germany is undoubtedly his supreme passion. As for F. I cannot trace in him the least evidence of a genuine love for his people or of devotion to its future.

Yesterday I preached on "The Freedom Indispensable to Democracy." I developed the thought that inner freedom consisted of an unreconciled heart, challenging mind and a will that is both dauntless and cooperative.

Today I preached at the Temple Anshe Chesed where Joseph ^{Zeitlin} ~~Stiklin~~ is the rabbi. The sermon which dealt with the theme of "Bondage in Freedom" led up to an appeal for the support of the Seminary. According to Zeitlin the appeal netted about \$1300.

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Wednesday, April 16, 1941

I find it very difficult to keep on recording the villanies of that contemptible skunk F. More of them came to the surface at the meeting with him and Edgar Nathan and Oppenheimer who are supposed to be the Board of Directors Committee on Teachers Institute. I suggested the calling of this committee in the hope of getting them to confirm what F had agreed to in the conversation I had had with him on Monday, March 24, namely, the allocation among the different departments of the funds collected for the Seminary. Having found them closeted with him for some time when I got there punctually I assume he had prepared them for what I was going to ask and had coached them to refuse my request. Both Nathan and Oppenheimer wanted to know why I wanted to have funds allocated to the Institute. This necessitated my telling them the story about Finkelstein's suggesting to me twice during this year the advisability of transferring the TI to some other organization, which of course means ridding the Seminary of the responsibility of carrying it. In true pilpulistic fashion he parried every one of the points I raised. I shall mention only some: I said that in all the 32 years I have been at the Seminary I have never been taken to task in such humiliating fashion, he replied that it was just that which has been wrong with the Seminary all these years, and it is his purpose to pursue a different policy. Things have been at loose ends in all departments. He is determined to tighten them up.

In answer to my complaint that his attitude of suggesting every other while the possibility of liquidating the TI is calculated to produce a sense of insecurity and to demoralize the work of the TI staff. He said that this was just what he wanted. He did not want to have the uncertainty of the Seminary's future confined to him, but communicated to everybody so that something might be done about it.

When I got through I was just where I was at the beginning. The only satisfaction I got out of the ordeal was that I did not loose my temper throughout the entire argument.

Right after supper I went to Salzman's to open the SAJ drive for the United Jewish Appeal. Considerable funds were raised that evening. Both last year and the year preceding the members of the SAJ contributed either through their trades or through the SAJ \$70,000 to the UJA. This is certainly a considerable amount for so small a group.

On the way home I told Ira what had happened at the meeting with F. and the Committee on T.I. He and Judith came to the house and we were later joined by Naomi and Selma. We discussed the advisability of my sending in my resignation to the Seminary right after Pesah.

The reason to be given should be that "I cannot work with F. who is employing all kinds of tactics to force me out of the Seminary. Knowing full well that it would not be feasible to resort to any pretext which might impugn the ideal of academic freedom so dear to the heart of the late Dr. Adler, he resorts to the chronic deficit of the Seminary as an excuse for threatening to liquidate the Teachers Institute. If the threat were at least frank and forthright one might know how to deal with it, but unfortunately his fondness for equivocation gets the better of him so that one does not know where one stands with him. His pretext is that it is his purpose to produce a sense of insecurity in the staff of the Institute, so that they might share with him his anxiety about the future of the Seminary. I cannot conceive that to be a genuine reason. To me it means only one thing: getting rid of Kaplan. If that is the way he feels about me, I prefer letting him have his wish to being badgered, intimidated and humiliated by him after having served the Seminary for 32 years with all my heart, my soul and my might."

I have always known Lena to be in complete accord with what I wanted to do, except in the case of my negotiations with Wise in 1923. But I have never seen her so determined in her urging me to resign from the Seminary, even though it means living on our limited savings.

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Thursday, April 17, 1941

Last night I gave the last of the series of paid lectures for this season under the auspices of the Jewish Welfare Lecture Bureau. This lecture was given at Temple Gates of Prayer where Rabbi Dubin, a TI graduate and one of the earliest graduates of the JIR is the spiritual leader. There was an attendance of about 150. They listened patiently the entire hour and 25 minutes that I talked, but I was not impressed by their response. The ~~few~~ few questions that were asked from the floor did not display much intelligence. The only two written questions betrayed the same phobia I have encountered everywhere, the fear that any attempt on the part of the Jews to establish a community which would be effective in dealing with the problem of discrimination and with the inner phases of Jewish life would expose them to the charge of having a state within a state. But after such a lecture I ask myself: Of what use is it? The fact that it does not lead to any action gives me the feeling of trying to breathe in a vacuum. The whole of so called Jewish life has an air of unreality about it.

This year I lectured at the following places: Ann Arbor (\$75), Detroit (\$100), Chicago (\$75), Twin Cities (\$200), Youngstown and Rochester (\$175), Cleveland (\$225), Worcester (\$100), Troy (\$75), New Brunswick (\$75), Germantown (\$100), Newark (\$150), Flushing (\$75). The total in fees amounted to \$1425 of which 10% was deducted by the Jewish Welfare Board.

Last year I turned in virtually all that I had earned from lectures to the Reconstructionist. It amounted, I believe, to a little over \$00. This year I am contributing \$200.

In figuring what I would have to live on in case I severed my connections with the Seminary, the need of having to depend on lecture invitations of the kind I have had this year does not strike me as very attractive. Whatever spiritual independence I might then enjoy would be ~~friff~~ frittered away in talking for talking's sake. The psychological effect on me of saying much and doing little is morally devastating.

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Monday, April 21, 1941

On Friday, April 18, the 7th day of Pesah, P preached on "Spiritual Impatience." It was an interpretation of (p. 60) and application of it to the contemporary crisis. The thought was that as a way out of the dilemma between defeatism and utopianism was to adopt the principle of malionism. By malionism I understand choosing the lesser of two evils or the greater of two goods; generally, of course, the former.

I learned yesterday from Ira that Zemach, a Seminary student of the graduating class, had given him an earful about the uproar caused in the various classes by discussion concerning the New Haggadah. Prof. L. Ginzberg was especially bitter in denouncing it. It did not receive a good word from any one.

Being used to and expecting such reaction I was not at all surprised at what Ira told me. So that when I went to class this morning I had forgotten all about the fuss. At the end of the first hour, however, Moses Davis approached me and told me that various members of the faculty had occasion to attack the New Haggadah and that I owed it to myself as well as to the students to devote part of the session

today to answering the objections that had been raised.

I proceeded during the second hour with the reorganization of the sermon that had been delivered by Barish during the first hour. Finding that I still had 15 minutes left without anything further to say about the sermon, I proceeded to answer my critics. I began by saying that if my critics are of the opinion that the traditional Haggadah is adequate then there is no use of discussing the subject. If on the other hand they too feel that the Haggadah is not adequate, why have they not done anything to make it adequate? Such indifference on their part to a condition that is in need of being remedied is unworthy of people with a sense of responsibility for the spiritual welfare of others.

In the course of the discussion which followed I had occasion to answer the following arguments: 1) The New Haggadah is bound to have a destructive effect by reason of its being issued by one who has influence in Jewish life. My reply was that there are plenty among the critics who have at least as great an influence. Why do they not formulate their views in the open? I am ready to meet their challenge point for point.

2) The making of Haggadahs and libritum will introduce anarchy into Jewish life. In reply I said: Would that sufficient interest were aroused in the attempt to render the Seder vital and significant with the possible result that there would be a flood of Haggadahs. This is infinitely preferable to the present state of growing apathy to the Seder due to the meaninglessness of the traditional Haggadah.

3) Jewish unity is bound to suffer. Answer: If freedom means anything it calls for diversity in unity. There would be greater and deeper unity in Jewish life if every Jew could observe Seder with a Haggadah entirely his own, then if only 25% of the Jews do with the old Haggadah ~~while~~ ^{while} the rest disregard the Seder entirely.

4) The repudiation of the traditional doctrine of Israel's election is a greater departure from normative Judaism than even the Reformist omission of Zion from their Haggadah. In answer I developed some of the ideas which I am at present trying to formulate concerning the doctrine of Israel's election.

5) The recital of the Haggadah is intended to create a mood and not to be taken too literally. This of course brings us back to the question whether it is successful in creating in the many the mood that it creates in the few who come to the Seder with long formed habits of Jewish living. In my opinion that is certainly not the case. Furthermore I question the value of a mood that is vaguely ~~sentimental~~ sentimental and that cannot be translated into meaningful terms for the life we have to live today.

I have to deliver an address at the first annual conference of the Adult Study Course under the auspices of the Seminary, which is scheduled for May 4. So long as I am at the Seminary I have to co-operate with F. I therefore accepted about two months ago his invitation to take part in the program of the Conference. I find it extremely difficult in my present mood to write the address, but I simply have to do it so as to get it off my mind. I intend to speak on "How to Vitalize Adult Jewish Study" and the following is what I expect to say:

The basic task to which we should devote ourselves in the undertaking to popularize adult Jewish study is to transform a need into a want. However much some of us may believe in the indispensability of Jewish knowledge to the mental, moral and spiritual health of the Jew, we shall not succeed in creating a demand for it unless we reckon with some actually felt want in the life of the average lay Jew some want which shall find its satisfaction in Jewish knowledge.

We must not make the mistake of judging the average lay Jew by ourselves who happen to have been so conditioned as to experience a desire to know more and more about the inner and outer life of our people, to understand the origin, development and present day values of the details of belief and practice that constitute Jewish tradition. Nor should we fall into the error of concluding that since nothing seems more reasonable than that Jews should want to know how to make the most out of their lives as Jews, they ought to be willing to devote some time each week to the study of such Jewish subject matter as we believe they ought to know. The mistake in this kind of approach is that we take our own interests -- which happen to be the interests of affirmatively conditioned Jews -- as a criterion of what ought to act as an incentive in getting people to join adult study groups and in maintaining their interest in Jewish subject matter. We forget that unless the majority of those we want to reach are convinced that the studies fulfil a specific function which they consider important, they will walk out on us, despite all the outward clap trap of registration, certificates and even the faddism which numbers give to any undertaking.

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Tuesday, April 22, 1941

We are bound to fail completely in the effort to create a demand for Jewish knowledge, if we will proceed from the assumption that there is no inherent reason why Jews should feel ~~any~~ any less need for Jewish knowledge nowadays than their ancestors felt in former times, if the furthest we go in condoning the indifference to Jewish knowledge is to recognize that there are numerous distractions which divert the Jew from the pursuit of serious study. The truth is that the entire scale of values by which the Jew lived in the past has been so completely upset as a result of his being integrated into the civic life of non-

Jewish nations that it is nothing less than absurd to measure Jewish needs and wants of today by the standards of yesteryear. It should be apparent that throughout the centuries when Jews lived a segregated life Jewish knowledge was bound to be for them an immediate and vital necessity without which they could not live as human beings. Segregation meant that Jews had to depend entirely upon their own cultural resources to escape becoming an illiterate people and degenerating into a kind of gypsy breed. The study of Torah gave the Jew literary, social status in his own group and religious experience which did service as an outlet for self-expression. Integration into the general population has rendered superfluous these advantages of Torah study. The educational system of the state and the vast chain of cultural opportunities of which the Jew either must or can avail himself supply him with literacy with the necessary knowledge qualifications for social status and with occasions for such self-expression as he is capable of. Undoubtedly there is still enough momentum left over from that accumulated during the centuries of segregation to impel some Jews to feel a need for Jewish study, regardless of the fact that it is no longer indispensable to their life as human beings. But it is a waning momentum and should not be depended on to supply the motivation necessary to give permanence and assure growth to the movement to further Adult Jewish Study.

What then shall we rely upon to furnish the incentive to the acquisition of Jewish knowledge? It seems to me that the more frankly and sympathetically we would deal with the inner conflicts which go on in the soul of every Jew, and the more eager and determined we would be to utilize Jewish study as a means of helping the Jew himself to ~~him~~ resolve them, the more likely we would be to render Jewish knowledge content relevant to the actual needs of our people. Jews are at present obsessed with doubts and questionings concerning the

worthwhileness of persisting as a distinct and identifiable group. They question the truth of the facts upon which that worthwhileness has hitherto been based; they find it impossible to retain many traditional practices which have hitherto been regarded as essential to Jewish life; they are troubled in not being able to harmonize the traditional conception of God with the rest of their experience. I am referring, of course, to the men and women who are mentally awake and morally sensitive and who exercise an influence over their fellows. These are the people whom we can ill afford to lose. If we want to retain their loyalty and stir them into participation in Jewish life we must not treat their inner conflicts as due merely to the ignorance of Jewish history and tradition. The effort to overcome that ignorance should be only the first step in adult Jewish study and only a means to the realization that the resolution of inner conflicts pertaining to Jewish life depends, like the resolution of inner conflicts in general, upon the initiative and exertions of the victim himself. No amount of outside stimulus can avail. The therapeutic treatment in the case of any inner conflict can at best only remove the hindrances from the sufferer's will, that prevent it from coming to grips with the difficulties responsible for his affliction. But unless the will is itself roused into action the patient is as badly off as ever. The same is true of the complexes from which the majority of thinking Jews suffer. What our men and women need is the kind of Jewish knowledge and information that will impel them to take hold of the very problems which beset them as Jews, and proceed to think and to act with a view to so being them.

It is only then that we shall overcome the blight of present day American Judaism in that it is the object of concern mainly of professional or career Jews while Jewish laity seldom displays any other than a passive interest in it. Rabbis, scholars, educators, teachers and social workers under Jewish auspices are necessarily confronted with tasks which compel them to deal with current Jewish problems of belief and practice. But so long as the laity fails to participate in the effort of coping with those problems and regards its function as consisting merely in following directions which are worked by professional Jews, Jewish life will not emerge from its anomalous condition. There are periods in the life of a people when its very survival depends upon the kind of mental attitude which pervades the men and women who constitute it. When the prophets sought to shake the people out of its complacency in which it was encouraged by those who kept on saying "All's well," they implied that if their people was to be saved from impending doom they must have the courage to realize the danger confronting them and do something about it. Similarly today the chances of Jewish survival are bound to be lessened if we adopt the attitude voiced by some of our leaders to the effect that they object to being a problem. Our only solution lies in having all of our people, lay and professional alike, realize not only that Jewish life is beset with problems, but that their saving it and making the most of it depends upon whether they will learn to grasp the true nature of those problems and make a strenuous effort to solve them. The main point, therefore, which I wish to stress is that if we want our endeavors in ~~and~~ behalf of adult study to be productive of permanent results and to contribute to Jewish survival and revival, we must avoid as far as possible the oracular approach which ignores challenges, questions and alternative affirmations. We must cultivate instead the problem approach in which we take the student into

our confidence, and, after making him aware of all the implications of the various factors of general and Jewish life that give rise to his inner conflicts, have him share the responsibility for working out the solutions.

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Wednesday, April 23, 1941

The subject matter of Jewish study should be of such a character and so organized and presented as to dispel from the minds of those who engage in it the notion that they are merely going back to school, where they can make up for their failure to have obtained a certain amount of worthwhile information. I am not deprecating the student attitude and the academic atmosphere in relation to Jewish study. But what I am deprecating is the usual passivity, the expectation to have information handed out in ready made packages, and the feeling of having gone through something once and for all after attending the prescribed courses, all of which attitudes accompany the student frame of mind and the academic atmosphere. Studies pursued in this spirit will have at best the limited value of an additional ritual which may for a time fill a void in the lives of people with something of the student in their make up. But they will leave untouched the men and the women of keen mentality who value knowledge for the difference that it makes in the understanding and the living of life. These are the men and the women who at present are apathetic to Jewish life and whose powers of leadership and influence must be wooed, if Jewish life is to emerge from its present abnormal state. The only way to woo them is to present the study of Jewish subject matter as an occasion for them to bring their best thought, devotion and energy to the solution of the inner problems that beset our people. Thus we shall succeed at last in having Judaism become the vital concern not only of professional Jews, but also of the laity; for, the laity, especially

the most intelligent high minded and forward looking element in Jewry will then have taken over its share of the responsibility for rendering Judaism livable and creative.

I shall now illustrate how the suggested approach to Jewish study would affect the selection and presentation of Jewish subject matter. In the first place we would become aware that all maladjustments in Jewish life may be classified into three categories: 1) those that arise from our uncertain status as a group both in relation to other groups and to the individual; 2) those that are due to the lack of clearly ~~xxx~~ formulated modern Jewish way of life, and 3) those that stem from the lack of a system of worship and ritual practice which symbolize and express a tenable conception of God. With that awareness in mind our initial task would be to acquaint the student with the entire evolution of Jewish life and belief until the turning point in Jewish history, when Jews began to have civic rights and when all of the maladjustments in Jewish life begin to manifest themselves. The Jew who is the victim of these maladjustments should be made to feel that his people was until comparatively recent times a normal people in the sense that the men and women in it regarded their affiliation with it as an asset and a privilege and had no suppressed desires to be gentiles. The Jewish past with its vicissitudes and developing beliefs and practices, with its leaders and sages and saints should be presented as the past, as something that was integrally related to a social cultural and political setting which no longer exists.

The knowledge of the past is indispensable for there can be no meaning to the present without it. But we must not make the mistake of investing the historical with the sanctity of the eternal. Such an attitude would only hamper us in our efforts to build a Jewish future. It is understandable, when we contemplate the sharply etched

pattern of practice and faith by which our forebears lived, in contrast with the amorphousness of present day Judaism, that we should be seized by nostalgia and wish we could somehow make that pattern our own. It is no wonder therefore that we are tempted to set up that pattern as the norm of Jewish life for our day, however remote it be from any possible realization. Such a pattern is like those bearded ghetto Jews whom artists delight to paint and etch but whom no one seriously expects to resemble. Those patterns of Jewish life and those pictures of ghetto Jews should by all means be studied as typical of Jewish life in the past, not as the norm to show how far we have deteriorated, but as a stage in the long evolution to remind us that there were norms which served the Jew in the past and that it devolves upon us to create norms that shall serve us as effectively as those of the past, served by our ancestors.

To avoid teaching the Jewish past either with the purpose of setting it up as a norm, or in the spirit of archaeology, we should adopt the objective of making our people fully aware of the vast gulf that divides the present from that past.

The dominant tendency of Jewish life in the past was centrifugal; the dominant tendency today is centrifugal. Formerly, although Jews had no status of their own, and were scattered and suffered persecution and humiliation at the hands of their neighbors they did not question the worthwhileness of their belonging to the Jewish people. Nowadays, even Jews living in democratic countries are for the most part obsessed with doubts and questionings concerning the value of Jewish life, and the most influential among them would definitely prefer to have the Jews absorbed as rapidly as possible by the rest of the population. The centripetal character of pre-modern Jewish life should be studied in terms of the three factors that contributed to it:

- 1) the nature of Jewish solidarity and the meaning that solidarity had for our forebears; 2) the character of the Jewish way of life and why they regard it as of supreme excellence; 3) their conception of

God, how it determined their world outlook and vice versa. It is quite feasible to reorganize the traditional subject matter, both biblical, post-biblical, and medieval with a view to a complete understanding of these three factors which in their synthesis constitute an excellent framework of reference for studying and interpreting the contents of Jewish history and tradition. Those factors are none other than those we commonly identify respectively as Israel, the Torah, God.

If the presentation of the past is to function as a means of preparing us to deal more effectively with the present, it is important to emphasize the dynamics and developmental aspect of the three factors Israel, the Torah and the conception of God. The Jewish mind must become accustomed to the idea that these three factors of Jewish existence underwent radical changes even in pre-modern times. Thanks to these changes Jewish life was enabled to retain its centripetal character and was prevented from disintegrating. We are now on the threshold of a new era in Judaism. These three factors will have to undergo changes in interpretation and application. Due to the infinitely increased tempo of modern living as compared with that of the past, changes have to be made deliberately and planfully, if life is not to get entirely out of hand. This is why we have to resort to the unprecedented procedure of deliberate readjustment and change, instead of permitting the needed changes to come about gradually and of their own accord. But if the changes are to result in the retention of the centripetal tendencies in Jewish life they must be effected as a result of participation by large numbers of our people who would be motivated by the desire to conserve and develop Jewish life, and not merely by professional Jews.

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Thursday, April 24, 1941

The function of adult Jewish study should be not merely to foster Jewish literacy but Jewish experience, not merely knowledge about Judaism and the Jewish people, but complete self-identification with the Jewish people as it expresses itself through Judaism. This can come about nowadays only through the Jew's direct participation in the threefold task of 1) achieving the kind of Jewish solidarity which will overcome the centrifugal tendencies in Jewish life and which is at the same time compatible with unhampered integration of the Jew into the body politic of the state; 2) formulating a way of life which, when put into effect, is likely to elicit the best in the Jew, and 3) developing a conception of God that shall enable the Jew to have the thrill of religious experience. I shall now indicate what participation in these tasks must mean from the standpoint of the kind of subject matter that ought to be presented in adult Jewish study courses, and of the spirit in which it ought to be approached.

Studies dealing with the problem of Jewish solidarity would have to open the eyes of the Jew to the anomalous situation in which he finds himself due to the fact that the Jewish leaders both spiritual and lay disagree among themselves as to the societal character of the Jewish group. In contrast with the unanimity that existed among Jews and Gentiles in pre-modern times as to the societal character of the Jew, there is at present a wide range of diversity among Jews themselves. In pre-modern times the Jews were a scattered nation in exile, looking forward to the return to Palestine. That is definitely stated in the prayer repeated daily before the morning Shema and "thou shalt lead us upright to our land, for we have trusted in Thy Holy name." It is to be assumed that in the study of Jewish history, the implications of segregation were fully developed in terms of the environmental factors which obtained in those days, and the political,

social and economic conditions which made that segregation inevitable. The student is now in a position to appreciate the need of finding the type of social structure into which Jews would fit so as to be neither segregated nor assimilated. That social structure would have as its hub the Jewry of Palestine. Without Palestine it would be far less possible to maintain the solidarity of the Jews of the different countries than it was in the past, for then Jews lived by a uniform code, a life wholly their own. No such code functions nowadays if we expect the very limited regimen of ritual practice that is as much honored in the breach as in the observance and the extent of integration in general life suffices in numerous instances to render Jewish life superfluous. Hence the effort to give social structure to as much of Jewish life as still survives must be directed at both ends of each spoke in the wheel of world Jewry, to the hub end which is Palestine and to the rim end which is the specific locality outside Palestine. It should be the purpose of Jewish study to get the Jew to understand the fundamental distinctions between the ancient and the modern nation, between a church and a nation, between a nation and a nationality. He must know of the relation of the church to the state, what has led to their separation and the nature of their mutual adjustment.. The alternative proposals that Jewish leaders have presented with regard to the status of the Jews, a nation, a nationality, a religious community, should be fully explored from the sociological, political and ethical standpoints. The various forms of social set up such as the synagogue, the community, the federation, the fraternal orders should be carefully analyzed. All this with a view of finally arriving at the kind of social framework which would give every Jew a sense of belonging, which would afford a common platform for the wide diversity in outlook and mode of life and which would facilitate the other functions of collectivity viz: stimulating the

individual to do his best and helping him to find himself at home in the world. (There is very little material for the study of these problems in Jewish solidarity. This is also true of the problems which have to do with rendering Jewish life creative ethically, esthetically and religiously. All that this means is that new study material must either be found or evolved. But let not the difficulty of providing such material tempt us into convincing ourselves that we can do without it.)

No less necessary than arriving at a satisfactory conception of the status of collective Jewish life is it to arrive at a set of criteria that would help to define what is meant by "a good Jew." Next to helping the individual to live, the group to which he belongs should put him on his mettle, and bring out the best of which he is capable. Throughout the past this is what the ^Torah did for the Jew. It set up a definite standard. Conformity with its tenets and practices made one a good Jew, and the reverence in which the ^Torah was held made one wish to earn that title. In the course of his Jewish studies, the Jew should be fully apprised of the factors that have contributed to the disregard of the ^Torah, in the traditional sense, as a norm of what it means to be a good Jew. This would clear the ground for that process of reinterpretation of both ritual and ethical practice, which would make of Jewish tradition a means of setting our people on the quest for the good life. It should be the purpose of adult Jewish study to train the Jew in this process of reinterpretation so that he would find the traditions of his people, even if not regarded as infallible, at least helpful in the formulation of those intellectual, ethical and spiritual ideals by which they would like their social and personal life to be organized. These studies should help the Jew to develop criteria based on present experience no less than on traditional values, of what constitutes the truth, goodness and beauty

which we would like to see realized in our lives, and to find the means of registering the approval and disapproval of Jewish public opinion for conduct that falls short of these criteria.

An unusual opportunity for utilizing Jewish study as a means of raising the ethical level of life is presented by the current social issues which hinge upon the rights and wrongs of property, of the state vs. the individual, of individual and collective uses of power, of peace and war. The general ethical principles and the golden rules in which our ethical tradition is rich offer no specific guidance by reason of their abstract character lack and the force of public opinion necessary to activate them. What we need is the cultivation of an ethical sensitivity to the issues involved in the various conflicts of interests and something of that passion for righteousness which is the eternal glory of prophetic religion. To experience passion we must do more than merely study and analyze the prophetic writings; we must study and analyze the social situations, the poverty, the disease, the slums, the unemployment and the many other social evils and note the extent to which they are due to selfishness, vanity, greed and stupidity as well as to sheer inertia. It would not at all be amiss, after having acquainted the Jewish layman with some of the typical instances of talmudic lore, with a view to illustrating how Jewish ethical values were translated into law, to include the exposition of the constitution of the United States and of outstanding legal decisions in the effort to utilize Jewish study as a means of sensitizing the Jew to ethical values.

Finally, it should be the function of Jewish study to introduce the layman into the problem of religion. A considerable part of the prejudice Jews have against Jewish life is due to the antiquated and bizarre notions they have of traditional religion and their complete ignorance of religion as an integral part of normal human experience

Modern political philosophy and philosophy of law are based on the theory of social contract. This does not mean that social contract is regarded as a method which was ever actually employed to organize human society. It means that whatever has to do with society, i.e., with the relations of the individual to the group, or of lesser groups to the group as a whole, proceeds from the hypothetical assumption that what holds a society together is the principle of voluntary surrender by each individual of whatever places him at an advantage over others to the group as a whole and his receiving in return whatever share of the advantage that accrues to the group as a whole he is, in the opinion of the group, entitled to. The social contract theory is an excellent illustration of the fact that when we deal with a situation in the spirit of "as if" we are not just making believe. It means that we are exploiting the possibilities of a situation instead of ignoring them. This is just what dealing with a situation from the educational standpoint generally means. It is in this sense that "G-d" and "salvation" are like "social contract" not finished static qualities but indispensable hypotheses for making the most out of life.

To realize how the assumption of social contract is indispensable to the maximum good to be derived from society, we need but remember what social contract sought to offset. It

tion of ethical values and ideals and where to seek it. Ethics is concerned with assertions that something ought to be which is not, or that something which is ought not to be, or that something which is ought to be otherwise than it is. T. V. Smith (ibid. 168) raises the question: "Can these claims be validated, and how? Validation means for him demonstration of the rightness of ethical values on grounds other than their successful working. He does not make clear the affirmative aspect of the validation he seeks. Basically, he still labors under the philosophical tradition which has found it necessary to dichotomize life into power and right, instead of viewing life as between neutral power and power conscious of the purpose to make the most out of life. Ethical values and ideals are not like scientific generalizations of fact. They are assertions of the will to make the most out of life. When we assert that something ought to be which is not we do so because we feel we can get more out of life than is being gotten out of it. It is because we can that we ought. This thesis of Guyau is in need of reiteration. But this is only the first step. The more difficult and important one is which of the things that we can do actually makes for more life, and how large a unit of life should we reckon with in determining abundance of living? This is where Sotenis touches upon problems which have hitherto found no place in ethics.

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both types of phenomena can be studied in a scientific spirit. Whereas the study of physical phenomena yields us, as a rule, affirmative knowledge, the study of mental social and spiritual phenomena yields us for the most part negative knowledge. The mistaken attitude that negative knowledge, knowledge of what we cannot know, is of little positive value, is probably the main reason for the failure to apply the scientific approach to the problems of human life. This is why those problems are in much the same state of incomprehensibility as they were when first broached. We must realize that the only time we shall ever get to understand how to deal with the problems of human life is when we shall have definitely marked off the areas in it which must remain ferra incognita, so long as the human mind is what it is. We shall begin to deal with life intelligently only when we come to realize how much in our general outlook on life and in our dealings with one another, we must not count on certainty but must rather be satisfied with hypotheses and postulates which we must count upon as justifying themselves by their consequences and not as demonstrable propositions. (See quotation from Nichomachean Ethics 1094G in Smith's Beyond Conscience p. 185).

One of the principal contributions that Sotenis can make to the problems of ethics is to indicate what constitutes valida-

means that it would have to give up the principles of supernaturalism and authoritarianism and adopt the principles of secularism and democracy. Should there arise then a conflict between the institutionalized conscience of the church and that of the state, there would have to be worked out a modus vivendi between them. From the standpoint of social progress, nothing could be more desirable than the development of a real spiritual check on the arbitrary power of the state.

Nov. 6/1940. The adjoining entry was written at 2:30 A.M. when I could not sleep on account of joyous excitement on the re-election of Roosevelt. For America and for the Jews I thank G-d.

In the attempt to approach the problem of salvation as making the most of life in a spirit of science, nothing should be further from our minds than the preconceived notion that such an approach is expected to yield exact knowledge of our objective and the specific means to its attainment. The scientific character of a particular approach to subject matter is not determined by the actual results achieved through it as by the passion for truth and objectivity uninfluenced by prejudice and authoritarianism and wishful thinking. It is evident that it is impossible to investigate, observe, infer, and generalize when we study mental social and spiritual phenomena which lend themselves to quantitative measurement. Yet

But the average human is hardly in a position to be so certain that his conscience articulates the actual will of G-d. Nor is it possible to set up any society in which every one or even a large number of people would rely upon the dictates of their individual consciences as articulating the actual will of G-d. Such certainty on the part of individuals would lead to anarchy. The only alternative is to resort to such formulation of what is right as is arrived at by the orderly processes of custom, discussions and final incorporation into law of the crystallized sentiment of the public. There exist at present two types of institutionalized conscience: that of the state and that of the church. The church to a large extent still retains the dogmatic attitude in that it claims that its conscience is the actual expression of G-d's will. Not so the state. Being a secular institution it could not advance such claims. Hence all that it does claim, from the standpoint of divine sanction, is that so far as it is possible for human beings to arrive at a knowledge of what is right, it has employed every possible means to arrive at such knowledge. Having done that, it can conscientiously claim that whatever it has adopted as legal and binding upon its citizens implies the existence of a Power that makes for salvation. If the Church were wise, it would reconstruct its traditional attitude and adopt an attitude similar to that of the state. This

in which case only he would consent to bear arms. The contention of Justice Sutherland who expressed the majority opinion was that when Macintosh spoke of putting his allegiance to the will of G-d above his allegiance to the government he meant "to make his own interpretation of the will of G-d the decisive test which shall conclude the government and stay its hand."

Sutherland's reply is: "Though we are a Christian people....also, we are a Nation with a duty to survive (We must therefore) go forward upon the assumption, and safely can proceed upon no other, that unqualified allegiance to the Nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the land, as well those made for war as those made for peace, are not inconsistent with the will of G-d." Macintosh lost his case because he refused to identify himself with any particular group which conscientiously objected to war. He thus did not recognize either the public or institutionalized conscience of either state or church, but relied entirely on setting up his own conscience as authoritative to him. This he could do only because he regards his own conscience not merely as implying godhood but as the expression of godhood. If he is indeed so sure of that voice being G-d's, the loss of citizenship can scarcely mean to him penalty. On the contrary, it should be to him a trial of faith from which trial he in all likelihood came forth all the more convinced that he was right and that he was acting in accordance with the will of G-d.

the course of action thus chosen will be generally adopted, we tend to identify it as the will of G-d or if conscience as the voice of G-d. This is a mistake and liable to lead to harmful consequences. The view we should take in all matters of right which have become law, is that the exigencies of life demand that we decide upon a particular course of action. Being limited by natural lack of what would give us complete knowledge of all factors which enter into any problem of right or wrong, we have to act on the basis of all the available knowledge, and exercise to the utmost the will to avoid the wrong and to do what is right. That attitude and its outcome imply that in the measure we adopt or the course of action we set up as just is the Power--not ourselves--that makes for righteousness or for salvation. But we have no right to take the position that that measure or course of action should be identified as actually the expression of G-d's will.

The relevance of the foregoing distinction helps us to evaluate a situation like that presented by the case of Macentosh vs. United States. (283 U. S. 605-635) Professor S. C. Macentosh of Yale University Divinity School was denied citizenship because he had refused to declare himself willing to bear arms in any future war in which the nation might be engaged. He had reserved to himself the right to decide whether the war in which the U. S. was engaged was a righteous war,

had to do with salvation as the actual will and functioning of the godhood. Hence the dogmatic attitude which characterized the ancients in their outlook on life. When experience proved that what was identified as divine did not make for salvation, or when the conception of salvation became such that the traditional means could no longer be viewed as furthering it, the reaction against such identification made itself felt in the complete negation of godhood. The effort to build up theories of life and conduct without reference to godhood gave rise to various political and ethical systems of thought.

An alternative to complete negation of godhood or to ignoring it altogether in the treatment of the problems of human life and conduct is the one suggested in the foregoing principle. That principle is that the limitations of the human mind are such that it can perceive godhood only by implication but not by identification. One does not have to note the existence of godhood to learn this concerning the limitations of the human mind. Take the case of rightness. There is many a problem when the human mind finds itself at wits' end to know what is the right thing to do. Does this inability to be certain as to what the right is justify us in assuming that the right is an illusion? The need to act necessarily compels us to select one course of action as the right one. We not only act upon it, but expect others to do likewise. To make sure that

mum of life realizable by the individual from the standpoint of his abilities and circumstances. Under normal conditions the action finally taken by the individual is the result of a majority decision. It is not to be expected that all of the conflicting desires, interests etc. should actually consent to a particular line of action. The principle and method of democracy obtain in the government of the self as in the government of the state. When that happens the person acts ethically, because such government of the self expresses the "will of G-d" or the Power that makes for salvation. When however, the desires, let us say, manage to assert their power and to render impotent the powers of the interests and ideals, there is inner tyranny. The conduct is unethical and the will of the Power that makes for salvation is flouted. The result is the loss of salvation.

A most difficult and yet a most important principle we should reckon with in all matters pertaining to salvation is that it is necessary to regard the Power--not ourselves--that makes for salvation as only implied in whatever we sincerely regard as salvation and as making for it and not as actually identified with it.

Thus when we are dealing with a religious tradition which was held to have been divinely revealed, we actually encounter the tendency that prevailed in the past to identify whatever

ciple shall the will of the state be formed? The answer is; On the principle of the will of the majority. That is the principle of democracy. No lawful government is possible unless the majority have the power to translate their will into action and unless the minority submit willingly to the majority. A state cannot possibly wait with its action until there is unanimity. If it were to do that, it would never act. What makes the action of the majority not only a matter of might but also of right is that the might of the majority is assumed to be in line with the "will of G-d" or of the Power that makes for righteousness. In case, however, a minority manages to terrorize the and to seize the reigns of government, we have tyranny. Tyranny is ethically to be condemned because as the expression of the will of the minority it cannot be in keeping with the "will of G-d," and is bound to defeat the cause of righteousness. In all of this argument G-d is viewed only ethically. Its attempt will here be made to square this conception of "G-d" which permits of his being in a sense defeated by the tyrannous power of the minority with the conventional conception of G-d as all powerful.

The foregoing suggests what happens in in feto in the
individual ego when he is divided by conflicting interests,
desires and ideals. Each of these represents a certain amount
of power. How great that amount is is determined by the maxi-

Who is that "we" which is spoken of here as being united and divided? Is the "ego" in each of us nothing but the sum of desires, interests and ideals or something more than their sum. It is difficult to conceive or experience the assumption that the "ego" is nothing but the sum of desires, interests, ideals, for then we could never experience the sense of unity. The desires do not entertain the interests, nor the interests the desires etc. Only something that is more than they could hold all of them. What is this that can hold all of them, if not the Power that makes for life--not ourselves and yet ourselves? Which somehow strives to reconcile these various and conflicting drives? It is at this very point that the self and the Power that makes for keeping that self integrated meet, and therefore the point at which we actually experience the reality of G-d.

Ethically, the question which concerns us every time we are torn by conflicting desires, interests and ideals is: Is there any norm for what is to constitute the right kind of decision upon which we can be said to be acting ethically?

Perhaps by making use of the method resorted to by Plato in the beginning of the Republic, we might find the correct answer. He uses the organization of the state as the model on which we should organize our individual lives. (369) The moot question in the philosophy of the state is: On what prin-

world. The discrepancy between the theory of reward and punishment and the actualities of life contributed to the conviction that salvation was unattainable in this world. From that moment on the of the Torah came to be chiefly the gains of immortality and the study of Torah and the mitzvot to be regarded as a means to the attainment of a share in the world to come. This new interpretation may not have become recognizable before the Pharisees came to be identified as a distinct group.

Nov. 5/40. What is the principle on which we should act whenever we are divided by different desires, interests and ideals? Our desires advise us, let us say, to spend our days in ease and pleasure our interests propose to us to pursue some objective that would give us power, and our ideals advise us to dedicate ourselves to some unpopular cause?

The striking fact that we can be at the same time both divided and united, divided by these desires interests and ideals and yet united in experiencing them as part of our very selves is a miracle which flies in the face of the logical principle that a thing can and cannot be at the same time. It is a miracle like this which justifies Hegel's logic of becoming.

This miracle is also an interesting subject for ontology.

him. Salvation then comes to mean a state of bliss in the life hereafter and in a world differently constituted from the present one.

Corresponding with the growth in self-awareness and in the notion of salvation is growth in the conception of a god. The function of a god comes to be mainly that of helping man to secure immortality and bliss in the hereafter. Again the magic rites which, from being means to fulfilling the will to live have become means to salvation, undergo a second transformation and become means to the deepened conception of salvation. The original practices associated with eating the animal that was supposed to harbor the demon whose power the primitive hunter needed to help him in the chase reappear in the orphic rites as means of becoming identified with the god who has the power of bestowing immortality upon those that enter into communion with him.

The Torah taken in its literal sense reflects the second of the foregoing stages when the Jews had attained sufficient self-awareness to distinguish between a god and a demon, to recognize the difference between life and life abundant and to give to the original magic rites the significance of religious rites. By the third century B. C. the Jews together with the rest of the environing society had achieved further self-awareness. Life abundant seemed to them unrealizable in this

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